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NOTES
PATENT LAW-PATENTS AND PRicE FxrNG--Corporations relying
on their domination of the basic patents in an industry to control the
prices of patented articles throughout the industry are standing on dan-
gerous ground in view of the recent rash of suits filed by the Anti-Trust
Division of the Justice Department under the Sherman Act, and more
specifically in view of two decisions in favor of the government handed
down by Mr. Justice Reed on the same day.'
In U. S. v. Line Material Co., et al.,2 the restraint arose from a cross-
license arrangement between the patent owners, Line Material Company,
1 United States v. Line Material Co. et al,.... U. S ..... 68 S. Ct. 550 (1948);
United States v. United States Gypsum Co. et al, .... U. S ..... 68 S. Ct. 525 (1948).
2 .... U. S ..... , 68 S. Ct. 550 (1948).
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hereinafter referred to as Line, and Southern States Equipment Corpo-
ration, hereinafter called Southern, to fix the sale price of the devices,
to which arrangement the other appellees, 3 licensees to make and vend,
adhered by supplemental contracts. The challenged arrangements cen-
ter around three patents for products which are useful in protecting an
electric circuit from the dangers incident to a short circuit or other over-
load. Two of them are dropout fuse cutouts, while the third is a housing
suitable for use with any cutout. Substantially all the dropout fuse
cutouts made in the United States are produced under these patents.
The dominant patent 4 in this field was issued to Southern, as assignee,
on an application of George Lemmon. The Lemmon application was
involved in interference with a co-pending application 5 assigned to
Line by the inventors, Schultz and Steinmayer. The decision of the
Patent Office, awarding dominant claims to Southern on the Lemmon
application and subservient claims to Line on the Schultz application,
made it impossible for any manufacturer to manufacture the products
when patents issued, without obtaining licenses from both companies
under their respective patents.
Such an arrangement was not long forthcoming. Line granted
Southern a license to make and vend the prospective Schultz-patented
apparatus with the exclusive right to grant sublicenses to others. Line
also agreed to sell equipment covered by the Southern patent at prices
not less than those fixed by Southern. Line then proceded to inform
practically all the other manufacturers of dropout fuse cutouts that
Southern had authority to grant licenses under the Schultz patent.
Later, however, both companies agreed to substitute Line as licensor
for the other manufacturers and to delegate the maintenance duties to
it. Although price limitation was actively opposed by several of the
licensees, including General Electric, the largest producer of the patented
appliances, all were forced to accept the terms or cease manufacture.
By accepting, they secured release from claims for past infringement
through a provision to that effect in the license.
Being convinced that the case of United States v. General Electric
Co.6 controlled and permitted such price arrangements as are disclosed
in the aforementioned contracts, the District Court dismissed the com-
plaint in the Line case. The General Electric case involved an agree-
ment between General Electric and Westinghouse through which West-
3 General Electric, James R. Kearney Corp., Westinghouse, Schweitzer and
Conrand, Inc., Railway & Industrial Engineering Co., W. M. Matthews Corp.,
Porcelain Products Co., Royal Mfg. Co., Pacific Electric Mfg. Co., and T. F.
Johnson.
4 Patent No. 2,190,102.
5 Patent No. 2,176,227; Re 22,412.
6 272 U. S. 476, 47 S. Ct. 192, 71 L. Ed. 362 (1926).
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inghouse was licensed to manufacture lamps under a number of General
Electric's patents i on condition that it should sell them at prices fixed
by the licensor. Chief Justice Taft, supported by a unanimous court,
upheld the price agreement as a valid exercise of patent rights by the
licensor. Speaking of this arrangement, Mr. Justice Taft said: 7
If the patentee . . . licenses the selling of the articles (by a
licensee to make), may he limit the selling by limiting the
method of sale and the price? We think he may do so, pro-
vided the conditions of sale are normally and reasonably
adapted to secure pecuniary reward for the patentee's monop-
oly.
The government asked the Supreme Court to overrule the General
Electric case and thus to shatter the precedent that a patentee has
power to establish a price below which a licensee may not vend a pat-
ented article. Although the decision of the court, written by Mr. Jus-
tice Reed, was in favor of the Government, he did not find it necessary
to expressly overrule the General Electric case in order to do so, hold-
ing: 8
As the Schultz patent could not be practiced without the Lem-
mon, the result of the agreement between Southern and Line
for Line's sublicensing of the Lemmon patent was to combine in
Line's hands the authority to fix the prices of the commercial-
ly successful devices embodying both the Schultz and Lemmon
patents. Thus though the sublicenses in terms followed the
pattern of General Electric in fixing prices only on Line's
own patents, the additional right given to Line by the license
agreement of January 12, 1940, between Southern and Line,
to be the exclusive licensor of the dominant Lemmon patent,
made its price fixing of its own Schultz devices effective over
*devices embodying also the necessary Lemmon patent.
By the patentees' agreement the dominant Lemmon and
the subservient Schultz patents were combined to fix prices.
In the absence of patent or other statutory authorization, a
contract to fix or maintain prices in interstate commerce has
long been recognized as illegal per se under the Sherman Act.
This is true whether the fixed price is reasonable or unreason-
able. It is also true whether it is a price agreement between
producers for sale or between producer and distributor for re-
sale.
7 Id. at 490.
8 United States v. Line Material Co. et al.. .... U. S ..... 68 S. Ct. 550, 560
(1948).
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The court further pointed out that as early as 1912 9 the Supreme
Court had unanimously condemned price limitation under pooled pat-
ent licenses and held that a price limitation was unlawful per se. In
applying the general rule against price limitation to the case at bar,
the court stated: 10
When patentees join in an agreement as here to maintain
prices on their several products, that agreement, however ad-
vantageous it may be to stimulate the broader use of patents,
is unlawful per se under the Sherman Act. It is more than an
exploitation of patents. There is the vice that patentees have
combined to fix prices on patented products. It is not the
cross-licensing to promote efficient production which is unlaw-
ful. There is nothing unlawful in the requirement that a
licensee should pay a royalty to compensate the patentee for
the invention and the use of the patent. The unlawful element
is the use of the control that such cross-licensing gives to fix
prices.
Mr. Justice Douglas, in writing a special concurring opinion advo-
cating that the General Electric case be overruled, castigated the price
fixing activities of the appellees as a powerful inducement for the
abandonment of competition, maintaining that such practices have
"saddled the economy with a vicious monopoly" in underwriting the
high cost producer by "protecting him against competition from low
cost producers."
In the case of U. S. v. United States Gypsum Company et al."1 the
appellees were likewise charged with violation of the Sherman Act by
conspiring to fix prices on a patented article, in this case a patented
gypsum board, and also on unpatented gypsum products. The appellees
were engaged in the production of gypsum and the manufacture of
gypsum wallboard, and gypsum plaster. Gypsum board is made by
taking the crushed and calcined mineral, adding water, and spreading
the gypsum slurry between two paper liners. When the gypsum hard-
ens, the mineral adheres to the paper and the resulting product is used
in construction. In 1912, United States Gypsum received as assignee
a patent to one Utzman 12 covering claims on board with closed side
edges, the lower paper liner being folded over the exposed gypsum core.
This closed-edge board was a revolutionary improvemnt over the open-
edge board previously used, since it was cheaper to produce, did not
9 Standard Sanitary Mfg. Co. v. United States, 226 U. S. 20, 33 S. Ct. 9,
57 L. Ed. 107 (1912).
1' United States v. Line Material Co. et. al. .... U. S ..... 68 S. Ct. 550,
564 (1948).
11 .... U. S ...... 68 S. Ct. 525 (1948).
12 Patent No. 1,034,746.
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break so easily in shipment, and was less subject to crumbling at the
edges when nailed in place. The patent was involved in considerable
litigation,Ls and each time was upheld as valid and infringed, where-
upon United States Gypsum would offer the infringer a license to prac-
tice the closed-edge board patent with a provision that United States
Gypsum should fix the price at which the infringer sold patented board.
Other infringers, when faced with suit, accepted licenses with similar
price fixing arrangements, until, in 1937, United States Gypsum had
gained complete control over the price and terms of sale of virtually all
gypsum board. Thus, United States Gypsum granted licenses and the
other defendants accepted licenses with the knowledge that all other
concerns in the industry would accept similar licenses, and laid the
foundation for the government's charges that competition was elimi-
nated by fixing the price of patented board, eliminating the production
of unpatented board, and regulating the distribution of patented board.
The government relied very strongly on documentary evidence in the
Gypsum case, such evidence including the licenses containing the price
fixing provisions, correspondence leading up to such licenses, and a
series of bulletins which United States Gypsum issued which defined
in minute detail both the prices and terms of sale for patented gypsum
board. One memorandum from one Blagden, president of a company
which infringed U. S. Gypsum's patents, to Sewell Avery, president of
United States Gypsum, pointed out that if his company settled on the
terms offered by Avery, the result would enable U. S. Gypsum to
"maintain a lawful price control and avoid the necessity of a reduction
by U. S. Gypsum of current prices to meet competition." 14 Subse-
quently, he accepted a license on the terms offered by Avery. Another
damning bit of evidence introduced by the government was the un-
veiling of the activities of a subsidiary owned by U. S. Gypsum named
Board Survey, Inc., which was established in order to insure compli-
ance with the price bulletins issued by U. S. Gypsum. Licensees were
invited to send in complaints as to violations of pricing bulletins to
Board Survey, and that organization forwarded the complaints to the
alleged delinquent licensees. Board Survey was authorized to make a
thorough check-up of all reported violations and to take such action as
it might deem necessary or proper to protect U. S. Gypsum's rights
under the license agreements and patents.
When the authors of these damaging documents were called to the
witness stand, they denied in most instances that they had acted
in concert in securing patent licenses or that they had agreed to do
is Bestwall Mfg. Co. v. United States Gypsum Co., 270 Fed. 542 (C. C. A.
7th 1921).
14 United States v. United States Gypsum Co. et al .. U. S ....., 68 S. Ct.
525, 531 (1948).
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the things which were, in fact, done. By way of reprimand, the
court stated, 15 "Where such testimony is in conflict with contempo-
raneous documents we can give it little weight, particularly when the
crucial issues involve mixed questions of law and fact."
Defendants in this case, like the defendants in the Line case, placed
great reliance on the General Electric case previously mentioned. Al-
though Justice Reed refused to overrule the General Electric case
(which he could hardly do in view of his decision in the Line case), he
nevertheless held that: 16
The General Electric case affords no cloak for the course
of conduct revealed in the voluminous record in this case. That
case gives no support for a patentee, acting in concert with all
members of an industry, to issue substantially identical licenses
to all members of the industry under the terms of which the
industry is completely regimented, the production of competi-
tive unpatented products suppressed, a class of distributors
squeezed out, and prices on unpatented products stabilized.
The Justice added that this conclusion followed despite the attempt
to make each individual license legal under precedent set down in the
General Electric case, adding, "lawful acts may become unlawful when
taken in concert." Repeating his argument upon which he relied in
the Line case that price fixing, without authorizing statutes, is illegal
per se, the Justice concluded: 17
Patents grant no privilege to their owners of organizing the
use of those patents to monopolize an industry through price
control, through royalties for the patents drawn from patent-
free industry products and through regulation of distribution.
Here patents have been put to such uses as to collide with the
Sherman Act's protection of the public from evil consequences.
The broad problem presented by these cases is not a new one. Shock-
ing disregard for the public good brought control of monopoly abuses
in the English Statute of Monopolies in 1623.18 The act, however, rec-
ognized the need for granting letters patent for a term of one and
twenty years to the first true inventor or inventors of any new manu-
facture.
The framers of our Constitution authorized Congress to establish a
patent system in Article I, Section 8.
15 Id. at 542.
16 Id. at 544.
.7 Id. at 544.
18 21 Jac. I, c. 3.
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The Congress shall have power... To promote the Progress
of Science and Useful Arts, by securing for limited Times to
Authors and Inventors the exclusive Right to their respective
Writings and Discoveries . . .
Congress passed the first patent act in 1790 and revised it in 1836. It
is generally agreed that the rapid progress in England and America in
the industrial arts since the Industrial Revolution has been greatly stim-
ulated by a protective patent system, by free liberal government and
by free enterprise. Monopoly is an abhorrent word to the true believers
in free responsible enterprise.
Committed nationally as we seemed to be to free competitive enter-
prise, we passed the Sherman Anti-Trust Act on July 2, 1890. The
historical reasons for that act must of necessity lie beyond the scope
of this note. The Act stated: 'a
Every contract, combination in the form of trust or otherwise
or conspiracy in restraint of trade or commerce among the
several States, or with foreign nations is hereby declared to be
illegal...
Since the enactment of that law it has been the duty of the courts
to draw the fine line between the legally granted monopoly of a patent
and the legally prohibited monopoly in restraint of trade. A twilight
zone does exist and since powerful corporations have chosen to operate
within that penumbra to extend their patent monopolies, the courts are
called upon to determine exact boundaries. If court decisions are in-
capable of protecting the general public welfare, legislation will come
of necessity.
The Bement v. National Harrow Company case, 20 decided in 1902,
would not call all restraint of trade illegal, but would divide restraint
of trade into reasonable and unreasonable categories and decide each
case upon the merits of the surrounding circumstances. The Court
stated: 21
But that statute (Sherman Anti-Trust Act) clearly does
not refer to that kind of a restraint of interstate commerce
which may arise from reasonable and legal conditions imposed
upon the assignee or licensee of a patent by the owner thereof
restricting the terms upon which the article may be used and
the price to be demanded therefor. Such a construction of the
act, we have no doubt, was never contemplated by its framers.
19 26 STAT. 209, 15 U. S. C. 1 (1890).
20 186 U. S. 70, 22 S. Ct. 747 , 46 L. Ed. 1058 (1902).
21 Id. at 92.
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The provision in regard to the price at which the licensee
would sell the article manufactured under the license was also
an appropriate and reasonable condition. It tended to keep
"up the price of the implements manufactured and sold, but
that was only recognizing the nature of the property dealt in,
and providing for its value so far as possible. This the parties
were legally entitled to do. The owner of a patented article
can, of course, charge such price as he may choose, and the
owner of a patent may assign it, or sell the right to manufac-
ture and sell the article patented, upon the condition that the
assignee shall charge a certain amount for such article.
As was previously stated, in 1926 the General Electric case approved
as lawful a patentee, licensee contract to make and vend the patented
article, wherein the licensee was required to sell the articles made by
him at a price set by the licensor.
The two cases, as used in attempts to justify extension of patent
rights beyond situations or conditions actually passed on therein, seemed
to set a favorable legal stage for the technical broadening of the patent
monopoly which could and did result in regimentation of whole in-
dustries by license and cross license agreements, which could include or
exclude producers, control resale prices, require the purchase of unpat-
ented materials, allocate or limit production, prescribe sales areas, es-
tablish and control the selling price of articles, and eliminate a whole
class of dealers whenever such was wished. During this period of
"freedom" and "free enterprise" the Hartford Empire, the United
States Gypsum Company and numerous other combinations were grow-
ing.22
It is to the credit of President Roosevelt, that in a message to Con-
gress April 29, 1938, he called attention to the "need for a thorough
study of the concentration of economic power and its injurious effects
on the American System of free enterprize." This message stimulated
the creation of the Temporary National Economic Committee by a joint
resolution of Congress.2 8 Th6 sound and fury over the testimony be-
fore that committee as well as over its final report still reverberates.
Books and articles have been written explaining, criticizing and de-
fending it.24 Abuses were revealed and have perhaps had some influ-
ence upon current court decisions. Many other articles assuming that
22 Footnote 15 to the opinion of the court in United States v. United States
Gypsum Co. et al, ....U. S ..... 68 S. Ct. 525, 542 (1948).
23 Public Resolution No. 113, 75th Congress, approved June 16, 1938.
24 FOLx, PATENTS AND INDUSTRIAL PROGRESS (2d Ed. 1942); BARNET, PATENT
PROPERTy AND =E ANTI-MoNoPoLY LAWS (1943); Thurman Arnold, The Abuse
of Patents, The Atlantic M4onthly, July, 1942; Langer, We Depend on Invention,
July, 1942 (An answer to Thurman Arnold).
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we are still a people believing in competitive free enterprise have ap-
peared in current periodicals charging injustices and abuses in the use
of our patents. 25 Neither courts nor legislatures will ignore for long
this rising tide of protest.
The patent bar and corporate executives will be asking in the light
of the Line Material Company decision and the United States Gypsum
decision, how broad is a patent monopoly? What is the advisability
of any price control in license agreements, in view of the aim of the
Department of Justice to secure an overruling of the General Electric
case, and in view of the acceptance by a minority of the Supreme Court
of the philosophy of the Justice Department? What is reasonable re-
straint of trade in the exercise of the patent monopoly rights? In view
of the growth of concentrated industrial power and regimented indus-
tries, even to the extent of world cartel systems, 26 what is to be our fu-
ture judicial and legislative direction in this field?
Basic assumptions may guide in prophecy. If free competitive en-
terprise is our aim, then vigilant and rigid control of restraint of trade
and of monopolies is a necessary concomitant. We rightly stake out
limited monopolies by our patent grants in that field of freedom. But
free enterprise is the broad rule and patent monopolies are the narrow
exceptions. Chief Justice Taft said in the General Electric Case:
It would seem entirely reasonable that he (the patentee)
should say to the licensee, "Yes, you may make and sell art-
icles under my patent but not so as to destroy the profit that
I wish to obtain by making them and selling them myself."
An answer might be, you (the licensee) pay me (the patentee) a reas-
onable royalty and if you can manufacture and sell my patented article
cheaper than I can, and still bear the royalty overhead from which my
manufacturing efforts are free, you should be manufacturing the article,
I should be living on my royalty, and the consumer should be buying
the article cheaper.
That seems to be the core of free competitive enterprise and seems
to be the encouragement and challenge which should be held out to the
efficient even as patent grants are held out to the inventive.
Even if the General Electric case stands as "rule of reason" law per-
mitting selling price control by the patentee over his licensee, it still
seems that when patentees and licensees, otherwise normal competitors,
25 War and Peace and the Patent System, Fortune, August, 1942; Chase, The
Rise and Fall of the Great Bottle Trust, Reader's Digest, December, 1947; Maisel,
Combination in Restraint of Health, Reader's Digest, February, 1948; Maisel,
Better Vision . . .With a "Kickback", Reader's Digest, January, 1948; What's
Holding up the Nickel Cadmium Battery?, Consumer Reports, March, 1948.
20 No Peace With I. G. Farben, Fortune, September, 1942.
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combine in agreements to control or fix prices, they invade the "unlaw-
ful per se" area of the Sherman Act. Such agreements with competi-
tors yield more than lawful remuneration, they yield also suppression of
competition and resultant monopolies.
We are a free and freedom loving people who by and large do not
like monopolies or "price controls" either by bureaucrats or Sewell
Avery. Our future attitudes toward patent monopolies will be condi-
tioned by their uses and abuses. We grant patents for the purpose of
promoting the progress of science and the useful arts. We grant to the
inventor a protected right to make, use or vend his invention for a period
of time. Both these grants are absolutely secondary to the general wel-
fare of all the people. So long as our enterprise remains free, patent
monopolies must not be a tool for a regimentation of industries or for
other purposes inconsistent with, or not clearly within the spirit of, the
aim to promote invention.
Our patent system is accepted as beneficial and sound by intolerable
current abuses will and should sharpen the anti-trust laws and their
application, even as other abuses created them.
John M. Anderton
Robert F. Burns
CIVIL RIGHTS-THE Ku KLUX KLAN MENACE.-An Associated
Press release of March 9th reports that the Ku Klux Klan claims an
increase in membership because of the civil rights issue raging in Con-
gress and throughout the South. "A newly issued pamphlet states that
the Klan is ready for a period of 'constructive planning and activity'." I
Such storm warnings should bring forcefully to the mind of every
American the need for affirmative action against this menace in Amer-
ican society.
The history of the Klan is fairly a matter of common knowledge. The
name and anti-Negro program are descendants of the old Ku Klux
Klan of the Reconstruction period; its nativism and anti-Catholic pro-
gram are akin to the Know- No- thing Party and the American Protec-
tive Association.2 The Klan reached its greatest strength in the 1920-
1930 era, then abruptly subsided and engaged in very little publicized
activity, although a similar hate element manifested itself as the Black
Legion, and more recently, the Columbians. Now it threatens "con-
1 Associated Press release of March 9th, 1948.
2 See the excellent discussion of the history of the Klan, as well as legislation
and judicial attitude: Note, 14 CoRN. L. Q. 218 (1929).
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structive activity" to combat an effort to secure to all citizens the rights
guaranteed them by the Constitution and laws of the United States.
Such threats should not go unchallenged. It is the purpose here to
consider means to check this outrage.
In the past, courts have generally lent their aid to protect the Klan
in its civil operations. Klan members have been told to exhaust their
remedies within the society before appealing to the courts, when chal-
lenging an expulsion. 3 Again, the Klan has been allowed to enjoin
the use of a similar name by another organization. 4 However, a cour-
ageous federal court has rendered a decision 5 which can point the way
to judicial disfavor of the society. In an action to enjoin an unauthor-
ized use of its name, and recover property allegedly stolen, and an
accounting of misappropriation, the court refused the Klan equitable
relief. The opinion is so forceful and direct that it deserves to be
quoted at length:
In view of all the facts disclosed by the evidence, the
plaintiff corporation, stigmatized as it is by its unlawful acts
and conduct, could hardly hope for judicial assistance in a
court of the United States, which is highly commissioned to
extend to all litigants before it, without distinction of race,
creed, color, or condition, those high guarantees of liberty and
equality vouchsafed by the Constitution of the United States.
A court whose .duty it is to recognize and uphold religious free-
dom as the first fruits of our civilization, to secure to every
accused the right to full knowledge of the accusation against
him, and a fair and impartial trial of the issue before a jury
of his peers; a court which fully recognizes that this is a gov-
ernment of law, and not of men, and that no man shall be de-
prived of his life, his liberty, or his property without due proc-
ess of law.0
As has been said, "If this rule is upheld by courts of equity, and adopted
by the courts of law, the Klan will be practically an outlaw."" It is
difficult to see how the principle could be applied in an action at law,
but the appeal to the conscience of an equity court is persuasive, and
could be adopted generally. Since it resorts to its own peculiar admin-
istration of justice, the Klan should not be allowed to claim for itself
what it denies to others.
3 Terrell v. Knights of the Ku Klux Klan, 155 Ga. 135 374, 116 S. E. 289,
793 (1923).
4 Knights of the Ku Klux Klan v. Independent Klan of America, 11 F. (2d).
881 (D. Ind. 1926).
5 Knights of the Ku Klux Klan v. Strayer, 26 F.(2d) 727 (W.D. Pa. 1928).
6 Knights of "the Ku Klux Klan v. Strayer, 26 F. (2d) 727, 729 (W.D. Pa.
1928).
7 14 CoRN. L. Q. 218, 222. (1929).
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Undoubtedly, immediate and effective action is possible at the state
level. There are two courses open to the several states to combat such
organizations. The first is through control of their incorporation: to
refuse to charter them, if their nature can be ascertained beforehand;
to revoke charters already existing, if their true nature becomes known.
Their claim of being fraternal organizations is fraud; they neither pro-
mote the general welfare of the members, nor do they uphold tradi-
tional American patriotic principles. Revocation of charters would re-
move the protection and condonation of the states. If they then con-
tinued to operate, they would violate state laws regarding incorporation
of such societies.
The second course of action is direct state legislation under the po-
lice power. Several states have laws making it a crime to wear a hood
or mask in public, or imposing more stringent penalties for crimes com-
mitted while masked, or making trespass while masked presumptive of
an intent to commit a felony.8 The courts of New York 9 have upheld
a law 1 0 requiring the filing of names of officers and members, against
a challenge of invalid classification and deprivation of due process.
Florida =1 has outlawed secret societies in the public schools, and that
legislation has been sustained.12 In the absence of specific legislation,
Klan activities could be prosecuted as riot 13 or unlawful assembly.
14
Since the Civil War, there have been various attempts at federal ac-
tion under the Fourteenth and Fifteenth Amendments. The Act of
1871,15 a force act, was fairly effective, but was subsequently declared
unconstitutional in United States v. Harris, 16 in 1882. It was there
8 See, as typical: Wnr.ms TrN. CODE ANN. (1934) §§ 11,030-11,033; CODE
or IOWA (1946) § 694.3; and see 14 CoR. L. Q. 218 (1929), citing also LA. "Hood
and Mask Law," LA. Rxv. STAT. (Marr. Supp. 1926) 999-1007; Miss. LAwS (1870)
c. 17.
9 People ex rel. Bryant v. Zimmerman, 213 App. Div. 414, 210 N.Y.S. 269
(1925); affirmed, 278 U. S. 63, 49 S. Ct. 61, 73 L. Ed. 184 (1928).
10 Cm R I IHTS LAw N. Y. (Cahill Supp. 1928) c. 7 §§ 53, 56.
11 F. S. A. (ch. 21777 1943) § 242.46.
12 Satan Fraternity v. Board of Public Instruction for Dade County ....
Fla ...... 22 So. (2d) 892 (1945).
13 Perkins v. State, 35 Okla. Cr. App. 279, 250 Pac. 544 (1926).
14 "An unlawful assembly is an assembly of three or more persons who,
with intent to carry out any common purpose, assemble in such a manner, as to
cause persons in the neighborhood to fear on reasonable grounds that the persons
so assembled will disturb the peace tumultuously, or will by such assembly need-
lessly, and without any reasonable occasion, provoke other persons to disturb the
peace tumultuously." Aron v. City of Wausau, 98 Wis. 592, 74 N.W. 354, 355
(1898). This case was cited in Shields v. State, 187 Wis. 448 204 N.W. 486 (1925),
which held that a Ku Klux Klan parade conducted in an orderly and peaceful
manner, permission therefor having been obtained from the city's mayor, was
not an unlawful assembly.
15 17 STAT. 13, Act of April 20, 1871.
16 106 U.S. 629, 1 S. Ct. 601, 27 L.Ed. 290 (1883).
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held that the Fourteenth Amendment would not support federal legisla-
tion against -the activities of individuals, but only against invasions by
the states. This principle has been reiterated in United States v. Cruik-
shank,17 and many other cases.' 8 Here again, however, we have a
judicial declaration that may pave the way for effective federal action.
United States v. Ellis, 19 decided in 1942, declares that Congress in-
tended the re-enactments of 1909 20 to protect the free enjoyment of
any right or privilege under the Constitution or laws of the United
States. These re-enactments may therefore play an important role in
support of federal action. This first section 21 forbids a conspiracy to
deprive any person of secured rights and privileges:
If two or more persons conspire to injure, oppress, threaten,
or intimidate any citizen in the free exercise or enjoyment
of any right or privilege secured to him by the Constitution or
laws of the United States, or because of his having so exercised
the same, or if two or more persons go in disguise on the high-
way, or on the premises of another, with intent to prevent or
hinder his free exercise or enjoyment of any right or privilege
so secured, they shall be fined . .. , and shall, moreover, be
thereafter ineligible to any office, or place of honor, profit, or
trust created by the Constitution or laws of the United States.
The second section 22 prescribes a penalty for deprivation" of those
rights under "color of law":
Whoever, under color of any law, statute, ordinance, regu-
lation, or custom, wilfully subjects, or causes to be subjected,
any inhabitant of any State, Territory, or District to the depri-
vation of any rights, privileges, or immunities secured or pro-
tected by the Constitution and laws of the United States, or
to different punishments, pains, or penalties, on account of
such inhabitant being an alien, or by reason of his color, or
race, than are prescribed for the punishment of citizens, shall
be fined not more than $1000, or imprisoned not more than one
year, or both.
17 92 U.S. 542, 23 L.Ed. 588 (1876).
18 See, e. g., Ex Parte Virginia, 100 U. S. 339, 25 L. Ed. 676 (1880); Civil
Rights Cases, 109 U. S. 3, 3 S. Ct. 18, 27 L. Ed. 835 (1883). Cf. U. S. v. Classic,
313 U.S. 299, 61 S.Ct. 1031, 85 L.Ed. 1368 (1941). For a thorough discussion of
the Fourteenth Amendment as the basis of federal legislation, see Callison and
Rawl, Federal Prosecution of Civil Rights Cases, 8 Yr.ml Boox oF THE SEvnLD
Socmrz 30 (1947).
19 43 F. Supp. 321 (W.D. S.C. 1942).
20 Criminal Code of March 4, 1909, 35 STAT. 1088, c. 321. See United States
v. Mosley, 238 U.S. 383, 35 S. Ct. 904, 59 L.Ed. 1355 (1915).
21 35 STAT. 1092, 18 U.S.C. §51 (1909).
22 35 STAT. 1092, 18 U.S.C. §52 (1909).
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It is noteworthy that the first section will support an indictment for the
conspiracy alone, no overt act in pursuance thereof being necessary. 23
To secure these rights: The Report of the President's Committee on
Civil Rights 24 suggests another means of supporting federal legisla-
tion. Missouri v. Holland,25 in 1920, held that Congress may enact
statutes to carry out treaty obligations, though in the absence of a
treaty, it has no power to pass such a statute. Under the United
Nations Charter, all members pledge themselves "to take joint and
several action in cooperation with the Organization for the achievement
of purposes set forth in AiT. 55." 26 (emphasis supplied). ARTICLE
55(c) requires promotion of "Universal respect for, and observance of,
human rights and fundamental freedoms for all without distinction as to
race, sex, language, or religion."
It is acknowledged that any legislation under the authority of a
treaty provision must necessarily have limitations, but.. . "all Treaties
made, or which shall be made, under the Authority of the United States,
shall be the supreme Law of the Land . ..", 27 and it is not beyond reas-
onable supposition that such legislation could be predicated upon the
treaty clause.
The President's Committee also urges strengthening the existing fed-
eral laws, clearly defining the rights protected to withstand the charge
of vagueness, and the establishment of a separate Division in the De-
partment of Justice to carry out the federal program. 28 To date, the
House Un-American Activities Committee has issued no reports of
hearings on activities of the Klan.29
The foregoing considerations concern effective regulation of the Klan
and similar societies, both by controlling the organization and by pen-
alizing activities calculated to deprive others of human rights. It is
often proposed that some means be devised to outlaw the Klan. The
difficulties in the path of such a plan are great. There is nothing ob-
jectionable about a truly fraternal organization, although it be secret.
There are grave constitutional doubts regarding an outright ban, and
23 Montoya v. United States, 262 Fed. 759 (C.C.A. 8th 1919). §51 was not
repealed in 1909, and stands good for whatever it properly covers. Powe v. United
States 109 F.(2d) 147 (C.C.A. 5th 1940).
24 Report of The President's Committee on Civil Rights, To Secure These
Rights, pp. 110, 111.
25 252 U. S. 416, 40 S. Ct. 382, 64 L. Ed. 641 (1920). See Hauenstein v. Lyn-
ham, 100 U.S. 483, 25 L.Ed. 628 (1880).
-6 U. N. CHARTR, ART. 56.
27 U. S. CONST. ART. VI, §2.
28 To Secure These Rights: The Report of the President's Committee on Civil
Righs, pp. 151-153.
29 Release of House Committee on Un-American Activities, April 1, 1948.
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it is probably unnecessary to attempt that drastic a measure. When a
government attempts to set itself up as a censor of thought, it teeters
on the brink of tyranny.
But it is not impossible to prevent the terrible effects of intolerance.
The true solution is legislation to curb abuses by individuals and or-
ganizations which deprive others of the freedoms they demand for
themselves, coupled with a sincere and determined effort to eradicate
through education the ignorance that engenders bigotry. Only by a
clear understanding and appreciation of God-given rightsand equality
and fundamental freedoms can the American nation resolve the prob-
lems it faces. True Brotherhood of Man depends upon a recognition
of the Fatherhood of God. With our own house in order, we can ac-
cept our duties of leadership in democratic action in the world.
B. M. Apker
LABoR LAw-COMMENT ON THE TAFT-HARTLEY ACT, TITLE III.-
A fair and just discussion of the Taft-Hartley Act 1 is impossible with-
out a fair determination of the purpose for which it was enacted. The
Act itself explains that its purpose is to protect by legal procedures the
rights of employees, employers, and the public concerning labor dis-
putes affecting commerce. But to understand fully the basic purpose
for this or another law applicable to labor-management relations, we
must examine the justification for government activity in the economic
sphere.
The purpose of government is to guarantee the common happiness.
All agree that a certain amount of material goods are absolutely neces-
sary to the happiness of men. It is the primary purpose of economic
activity to produce and distribute these material goods. If the eco-
nomic forces acted so as to guarantee that amount of material goods
requisite to the happiness of all individuals within their sphere, there
would be no justification for governmental regulation of economic ac-
tivity, provided, of course, that all of the other rights of the individual
were also guaranteed.
Our nation has embraced the capitalistic system. Therefore, it is
the duty of this economic system to guarantee to all individuals within
its sphere the production and distribution of material goods relating to
their happiness. If the economic system does not guarantee this produc-
tion and distribution, it is the duty of the government, then, to take
the necessary steps in regulating capitalism so that happiness of all
will result.
1 Labor Management Relations Act, 1947, 61 STAT. 120.
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It is beyond denial that "free"--that is, laissez-faire--capitalism
failed to exercise the before-delineated function of the economic system.
During the period of rampant industrial expansion of the late Nine-
teenth and early Twentieth centuries, large segments of the propertyless
working classes and the farmers were reduced to economic slavery. The
unregulated capitalistic system, which, by its very nature, gives an ad-
vantage to the employer 2 had demonstrated its incapacity to serve the
wants of human beings. Therefore, since this natural advantage could
best be offset by workingmen combined together, for the purpose of
presenting their collective grievances, labor unions came into existence.
But these, without governmental protection, were placed at a great dis-
advantage themselves because their activities were looked upon with dis-
favor by all employers, most courts, and some legislators. Therefore,
since the capitalistic system had shown its inability to function properly
without being regulated, the government at last stepped in between labor
and management and secured to each the right of collective bargaining
which is the very life blood of trade unionism.
Legislation which is generally regarded as "favorable to labor" culmi-
nated in the National Labor Relations Act, passed in 1935.3 The policy
of this Act-that of encouraging amicable settlements of labor disputes
by collective bargaining--is the guiding principle of all governmental
interference with labor-management relations.
As long as both parties come to the bargain table in good faith,
neither party may be forced to concede any of its positions. The Na-
tional Labor Relations Board has the power to determine-upon the
complaint of either of the parties-whether or not an unfair labor prac-
tice is being perpetrated by the other party. The Board has never tried
to decide summarily the primary incidents of labor relations. Statutory
enactments cannot solve the basic problems of labor and management;
to pretend to do so would be to destroy the basis of our free enterprise
svstem. These basic issues must be left to the disputants themselves.
The bargaining power of both parties must be equal.
Nevertheless, there are those who reached the conclusion that the
scales had swung far in favor of the unions. A series of particularly
spectacular strikes, coming upon the heels of the war, stirred up a wave
of emotionalism against the unions. The proponents of change in th
Wagner Act wrote the Taft-Hartley Act, which is the subject of discus
sion here.
2 ADAm SMITH, WYALTH or NATIoNs Chapter 4, enunciates the fact of em-
ployer or master supremacy by the very nature of a capitalistic economy. Whether
this is to be considered an inherent weakness in the capitalistic system depends
upon the economic philosophy of the individual, but the fact of the advantage can
hardly be questioned.
3 49 STAT. 449.
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The Taft-Hartley Act has been divided into five titles. Title I4
and Title II5 have been discussed in previous issues of the NoTRE
DAME LAWYER. We shall discuss Title III.
Section 301 of the Taft-Hartley Act reiterates the already accepted
fact that unions are liable in court actions for violations of any con-
tracts into which they may enter. Any district court of the United States
may now, however, assume jurisdiction of a case involving a labor dis-
pute without the ordinary requisites concerning the amount involved or
diversity of citizenship. The requirement of the Norris-LaGuardia Act 6
that the liability of labor unions for acts of its agents could only be
imputed to the union when there was authorization or ratification by
the union has been changed by the Taft-Hartley Act. Now the author-
ization or ratification is not to be controlling. Mr. Taft has indicated
that this provision was included in the Act to render unions liable for
wildcat strikes which the unions have neither ordered nor approved. It
is, of course, the prerogative of the National Labor Relations Board, in
each particular case, to determine whether or not a person acted in the
particular circumstances as an agent of the union. This provision, how-
ever, will undoubtedly render the agency relationship more readily
attachable to the labor union and thus reduce their financial power ac-
cording to the damages assessed against them for an act they did not
direct or approve. Thus we see that more responsibility for labor union
members' actions has been placed on the union while many provisions
of the Act lessen the control that a union may exercise of its members.
Section 302 of the Act makes any payment of part of the worker's
paycheck by an employer to a labor union a crime. This provision is
aimed at the "check-off" of union dues, initiation fees and assessments,
a system whereby union financial obligations are paid directly from
the employer to the labor union. This system may be reinstated if
the employee makes a written assignment signifying that he so desires
the dues to be taken out of his paycheck and paid directly to the
union.
At present writing, many unions are exerting great effort to have all
union members make this assignment so that their dues may continue
to be checked off. The purported purpose of this provision was to pre-
vent unwilling members from being forced to pay dues against their
will. It cannot be doubted, however, that all who reap the benefits of
labor union activity should share in the burden of its expense, particu-
larly those who are members. If a member should pay dues, it seems in-
consequential how he does so. Forcing unions to create added facili-
4 Note, 23 NoTRE DA~m LAWYER 238 (1948).
5 Note, 23 No=R DAm: LAwYER 349 (1948).
6 47 STAT. 106 (1932), 29 U. S. C. § 71 (1934).
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ties for collecting their dues appears, then, to be merely another method
of reducing labor union efficiency.
Section 302 (c) (5) also provides that life, health or accident insur-
ance, or other like pension funds may be created and that the employer
may contribute directly to the trust fund provided that the administra-
tion of the fund complies with the procedure outlined in this section
of the Act.
This section will take added importance in the view of the National
Labor Relations Board decision in the Inland Steel case in which the
Board decided by a four to one decision that pension plans come within
the scope of the Taft-Hartley Act which requires both employers and
unions to bargain collectively, "with respect to wages, hours, and other
terms and conditions of employment." 7 This decision met, of course,
with violent disapproval by reactionary laissez faire capitalists who
immediately claimed it to be another trend toward socialism in Ameri-
can economy. The government of the United States has determined,
however, that such old age or emergency security is a necessary requi-
site to an individual's material happiness. For management and labor
without government intervention to provide this requisite material bene-
fit themselves is rather a retention of the free enterprise economic sys-
tem than a trend toward socialism as claimed. Since it is the role of
the economic system to produce and distribute material wealth, these
incidents of material security seem to be necessarily within the role of
economic activity.
Section 303 of the Act outlaws many secondary boycotts on the part
of labor unions and gives to the injured party a right to an action
for damages. By virtue of this provision, unions may not engage in
strikes or partial work stoppages which have as their objects certain
benefits which will indirectly accrue to the unions. Unions may not force
other workers or working employers to unionize; they may not force
others to discontinue doing business with a third party; they may not
force another employer to bargain with a union not certified according
to the Taft-Hartley Act; 8 nor may a labor union force an assignment
of work by an employer to a particular union or craft.
This section of the Act specifically declares the above secondary
boycotts unlawful and gives a right of damages to the party injured
by such a boycott. It is to be distinguished from section 8(b) (4) of
the Act which makes the same secondary boycotts unfair labor prac-
tices, for which the National Labor Relations Board may secure preven-
tative injunctions. An injunction has been issued, however, at the
7 Sec. 8 (b) (6) (d).
8 Title I of the Labor Managements Relations Act, 1947, sets out union cer-
tification procedure.
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instance of the injured partr under section 303, the court determining
that the action at law for damages was inadequate and that the pros-
pective damages because of the boycott would be irreparable. This
court also upheld the constitutionality of this provision of the Act.9
This was the first action grounded on section 303 to be presented to a
federal court. A subsequent case also upheld the constitutionality of
this section outlawing certain secondary boycotts by enjoining a labor
union from the picketing of a third party who was doing business with
the labor union's disputant.' 0
By outlawing such secondary boycotts, the Taft-Hartley Act has
taken tremendous influence from the labor unions in jurisdictions in
which courts had recognized the boycott as a legitimate method of
enforcing labor's just demands. Unions now are limited greatly in ex-
erting collective pressure on all those members of management who are
doing business with an individual with whom the union is disputing.
To say that these other businesses dealing with an unfair employer
can be of no assistance to the union by refusing to deal with the unfair
employer is childish naivete. Secondary boycotts have been considered
unlawful, though, prior to the passage of the Taft-Hartley Act, because
courts and legislatures have determined that a disinterested third party
should be allowed to carry on his business unmolested by outside labor
disputes. It is the theory of these courts that concerted action to force
a third party to take a particular course of action, the secondary boy-
cott, is not a justifiable means of obtaining eventual economic benefits.
These courts do not forbid, of course, the use of direct ostracism of an
unfair employer, commonly known as the primary boycott. It is the
exertion of force upon a third party coercing him to take a particular
course of action against another that is considered objectionable. How-
ever, if the labor union is a fully collective society for the benefit of all
9 Gomez v. United Office and Professional Workers of America, C. I. 0.,
Local 16, et al., 73 F. Supp. 679 (D. C. D. C. 1947). In this case the union had
peacefully picketed a Washington, D. C. dance studio to bolster its fight against
a New York studio of the same name. The restraining order was issued when it
appeared that the amount of the studio's loss of trade resulting from the boycott
would be difficult to prove and also that the studio would be injured irreparably.
1,0 Dixie Motor Coach Corporation v. Amalgamated Association of Street,
Electric Railway and Motor Coach Employees of America, et al., 74 F. Supp. 952
(W. D. Ark. 1947). Here the union had called a strike against the Southern Bus
Lines, Inc., demanding changes in wages and working conditions. Southern Bus
Lines continued to operate their busses while their employees were on strike. In
operating their busses, the Southern Bus Lines used the terminal of the plaintiff,
Dixie Motor Coach Corporation. The union threatened to picket the plaintiff
if he continued to allow the Southern Bus Company to operate their busses from
the Dixie Motor Coach Corporation terminal. The plaintiff obtained a permanent
injunction against the union forbidding the union to picket the plaintiff's term-
inal since the picketing was for the purpose of forcing one person, the plaintiff,
to discontinue doing business with a third party, the Southern Bus Company.
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employees, it is only reasonable to expect that each member of the so-
ciety will desire to aid his brethren in any feasible manner. It is the role
of the courts and legislatures, however, to limit within reasonable bounds
those means by which unions effect their mutual benefit. Undoubtedly
the freedom of speech, press and assemblage has been curtailed by the
outlawing of the secondary boycott. Whether it has been abridged un-
reasonably; whether the disinterested third party should be insulated
from a particular phase of labor-management relations which have had
a forceful bearing on labor union effectiveness in the past, must be de-
termined not from a microscopic viewpoint of the particular situation.
Rather the legality of boycotts should be considered in reference to the
amount of bargaining power a labor union must have to guarantee equal-
ity at a collective bargaining table with management. The possibility
of ostracism of the bargaining employer by other employers .would have
a direct bearing on the willingness of said employer to reach an agree-
ment with the labor union. Whether the boycott prerogative is neces-
sary to equalize the bargaining power of labor and management is the
question.
The outlawing of labor union jurisdictional disputes appears to be a
valid restriction on the scope of union activity. These are problems
within the collective employee society itself, the solution of which should
not be allowed to interfere with the production or distribution of goods.
The just distribution of material goods in relation to the employer is in
no manner enhanced by allowing internal labor union problems to dis-
rupt the production of those goods.
However, the broad prohibition which the Taft-Hartley Act places
on secondary boycotts appears to be a definite curtailment of possibly
necessary incidents of labor union effectiveness.
Section 304 of the Taft-Hartley Act amended section 313 of the
Federal Corrupt Practices Act," making it unlawful for any labor or-
ganization or corporation to make an expenditure in connection with any
election at which candidates for a federal office are to be selected or
voted for. The penal sanctions of this section extend also to an officer
of a labor organization or corporation who consents to such an expendi-
ture by the organization of which he is an officer. The definite purpose
of this provision was to prevent labor unions from expressing their
views on federal politics by speeches or through publications supported
by union funds. The Political Action Committee of the C. I. 0. would
have been forced to cease operations unless it could have mustered ex-
pense funds from sources outside the union.
This provision of the Act was declared unconstitutional on March
15, 1948, in the District Court of the United States for the District of
11 43 STAT. 1074 (1925), 2 U. S. C. § 251 (1934).
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Columbia.' 2 District Judge Ben Moore held that the portion of the
Act forbidding labor unions to sustain expenses in expressing their po-
litical views was an unconstitutional abridgment of freedom of speech,
freedom of the press, and freedom of assemblage.
In this case, the government pressed its criminal charges against the
C. I. 0. and Philip Murray on the basis of section 304 of the Taft-
Hartley Act. Mr. Murray, obviously in defiance of this provision, had
written an editorial in the C. I. 0. News, a publication sustained by
labor union funds, expressing union views concerning an impending
federal congressional election. The government conceded that the
Taft-Harfley provision abridged rights of individuals as guaranteed by
the First Amendment, but contended that Congress had the power to
abridge these rights because of its interest and control of elections and
therefore Congress was acting within its constitutional power in enact-
ing section 304. Judge Moore brushed this contention aside by stating
that the constitutional rights of free speech and a free press in elections
could only be abridged when a grave abuse calculated to create serious
public danger existed or was impending. No such situation existed
merely because labor unions were expressing their political views through
labor union publications. In fact, the public has an important right
to hear both sides of a political issue through the presses; a right which
the Taft-Hartley Act sought to abridge. Judge Moore explained that
the majority of any collective group expresses the ideas of the group,
and the fact that a certain minority might hold conflicting views was
no sound basis to abuse the constitutional guarantee of free speech, a
free press, and the freedom of assemblage. Thus this section of the
Taft-Hartley Act, which would have seriously impaired the efficiency
of labor unions in attracting public audience for their views, seems to
be no longer the law of the land.
Section 305 makes strikes by government employees unlawful and
provides penalties of loss of employment and loss of civil service status
by the employee so striking. There seems to be no justifiable objection
to such a provision under present circumstances. Employment by the
government is a privilege for which the government should have the
right to designate reasonable conditions of acceptance. The government
occupies a different position as employer than does management gener-
ally. The distinction between their relative positions is the important
differentiating feature. The guarantee of employee rights against man-
agement lies in part in the strike. Both the employee and the public
can protect their rights against the state by voting in a new govern-
ment. No such guarantee, obviously, exists for the employee of private
management.
12 United States v. Congress of Industrial Organizations, 16 L. W. 2452
(D. C. D. C. 1948).
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It seems reasonable, then, for the government to demand that it be
allowed to carry on its delegated sovereign functions devoid of the pos-
sibility of a paralyzing strike. This provision of the Act, of course,
does not prevent any individual employee acting as an individual to
quit his job at his pleasure and seek his material gain in that part of
the economic sphere where he is guaranteed the right to strike, or
rather, where he should be guaranteed the right to strike. An over-
whelming majority of laborers make their livings from private enter-
prise, and for this reason their right to strike must be protected. For
them no alternative exists. This alternative seems conclusive of the
reasonableness of section 305.
Since the publication in the NoTmE DA LAwYER of comments on
Title I and II of the Taft-Hartley Act, labor-management relations
have raised many interesting questions pertaining to those sections of
the Act. In this comment we will endeavor to discuss a few of the re-
cent National Labor Relations Board rulings and court decisions applic-
able thereto.
By a two-to-one decision, a statutory three judge court sitting in the
District of Columbia upheld the validity of the filing of the non-com-
munist affidavit as a requirement for Board benefits. In the case 1 8
presented to the court, the Maritime Union, among other plaintiffs,
sought to enjoin the enforcement of the affidavit requirement provision
of the Labor Management Relations Act which would deny the union
recognition by the Board. All the judges upheld the validity of the
financial statement requirement, but a serious question arose concerning
the constitutionality of the requirement of filing a non-communist affi-
davit as an abridgment of the First Amendment guarantee of the free-
dom of speech. Both the majority and the dissent agreed that the
filing of a non-communist affidavit could be, in the broad requirement of
section 9 (h) of the Taft-Hartley Act, an abridgment of the First
Amendment. Both agreed that conditions giving rise to a justifiable
abridgment of free speech must be of such a nature that to speak or to
refrain from speaking would present a menace to the welfare of the
nation.
Without referring to the lengthy opinion of the majority, fraught
with dicta, nor to the juridical analysis of the problem expressed by the
dissent, it seems fair to state that the clash of views between the ma-
jority and the dissent arose over a question of the type of evidence which
the court required to make a constitutional determination.
The majority took the view that the court could take judicial notice
of the "facts of current history" along with the congressional determina-
1:3 National Maritime Union of America v. Herzog, 16 L. W. 2502 (D. C.
D. C. 1948).
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tion that communist activity in labor unions was insidious to the gener-
al welfare, and with no evidence offered to the court on that subject
whatsoever, decide whether an abridgment of free speech by Congress
was justifiable. The dissent did not agree on this point, but felt that
a determination of the danger of communistic union activity to the gen-
eral welfare demanded that the court so determining should be presented
with evidence from which a conclusion could be made. The word of
Congress was not to be accepted on this point. The dissent felt that,
were evidence not required, Congress would be at liberty, by merely
making an affirmation of a fact, to flout constitutional rights with im-
punity. It was the duty of the court, it was said, to make its own sepa-
rate, independent determination of fact if it were to speak as an inde-
pendent court. Thus, the dissent argued, since no evidence was offered
as to the relative danger of communism to the general welfare, the guar-
antee of the First Amendment must stand.
In the highly publicized United Mine Workers coal strike the stun-
ning power of the Taft-Hartley Act completely to subjugate unions is
conclusively demonstrated. When a pension plan agreement was not
carried out by the coal operators, union leader John L. Lewis informed
his union members that the contraqt had been violated and that the
miners were free to work or not as they pleased. A general mining
stoppage immediately occurred. Acting under the provisions of the Taft-
Hartley Act, most probably inserted in the Labor Management Rela-
tions Act for this exact situation, the President appointed a board to
investigate the stoppage. The board was to determine whether the in-
activity would be inimical to the general national welfare.
Acting on the board's report, the government obtained a restraining
order prohibiting the strike. The stoppage continued; Mr. Lewis claimed
that he had called no strike and explained that miners do not work un-
der broken contracts. Later a pension agreement was reached between
the operators and Lewis. However Judge Goldsborough, of the United
States District Court for the District of Columbia, found that the re-
straining order had been violated in that the union was guilty of con-
tinuing a strike after the issuance of the prohibition. 14 The contention
of Lewis that he had called no strike was by-passed when the Judge
ruled that any union functioning as a union must be held responsible
for mass actions of its members. The Judge declared that Lewis' tele-
grams to the union locals contained code messages indicating that a
strike was called. The heavy penalties, along with an eighty day Taft-
Hartley statutory injunction 15 influenced Lewis to urge his miners
14 United States v. International Union, United Mine Workers of America,
16 L. W. 2515 (D. C. D. C. 1948).
15 The eighty-day injunction is authorized under the National Emergency
section of the Taft-Hartley Act, Sec. 206-210.
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back to work again. The right to engage in a strategic strike was thus
completely abridged as far as the United Mine Workers were concerned.
The provisions of the Taft-Hartley Act wound the miners in a web of
futility.
Judge Goldsborough, in issuing the statutory injunction, upheld the
constitutionality of the applicable provisions of the Taft-Hartley Act.
The court pointed out that an injunction to prevent a strike has never
been held to be a deprivation of the liberty of speech nor does it con-
stitute involuntary servitude. Presumably, indicated the judge, an
inhabitant of an exclusively mining town can choose to work, starve,
or move himself and his family to a new locality.
Undoubtedly a peaceful method of preventing national economic
emergencies which result from basic industrial strikes must be found.
However, to ignore completely the rights of labor in benefiting the pub-
lic is hardly just. It has been suggested that this problem might be
solved by declaring these basic industries public utilities. Some such
governmental action appears inevitable if collective bargaining in basic
industries proves futile.
Numerous other incidents of the use of the injunction have occurred
recently by virtue of the Taft-Hartley Act, preventing labor union ac-
tivity when the unions have attempted to enforce their demands.10
The Act entangles the unions in injunctions, court costs, attorney fees,
and new National Labor Relations Board requirements. These demands
reduce severely the efficiency of labor unions in carrying out their pur-
pose of protecting labor. The Taft-Hartley Act has been congratulated
recently by many devotees of big business because of its success in
quieting the labor seas, particularly in its rapid termination of the coal
strike. Usually these settlements have been brought about by labor
unions withdrawing their demands in the face of the tremendous legal
power of the Taft-Hartley Act. To continue to press their demands
only to reach eventual failure in the courts causes many unions to capit-
ulate immediately. For this quiescence the Taft-Hartley Act has been
complimented as being the instrumentality of settling the disputes. We
would indicate that there exists an infinite difference in the meaning of
the word settle and the word suppress.
Returning now to our original premise, we see that the primary pur-
pose of an economic system is the production and distribution of
wealth. Wealth, however, is not an end, but a means to the end of
the happiness of all. Wealth is not held absolutely, but as a steward-
16 United States News and World Reports, April 16, 1948.
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ship for Him Who created the wealth. 17 We noted that before the rise
of- strong labor unions, this wealth was far from properly distributed.
No valid argument can exist that the pro-labor legislation of the
thirties did not assist in a more just distribution of this wealth. We
are of the opinion that whatever ills, if any, labor unions have brought
to this country, one of them was not the change they brought about in
the distribution of material goods.
Labor's position under this social legislation bettered its economic
position and took from capital much of the unequal strength with which
it had previously coerced labor. Management's position under the
Wagner Act based on its natural advantage, did not deteriotate as to
deprive it of its just share of the fruits of production. If there were ills
in the labor-management relation, they did not exist in the field of dis-
tribution.
But the Taft-Hartley Act, which was enacted for the avowed pur-
pose of disrupting the bargaining power balance then existent, tends to
return management's supremacy at the bargaining table. It so ham-
strings labor's right to strike, to control its labor union members and
to effect efficiently its role as a guarantee of individual rights that the
guarantee no longer exists. As was stated in previous comments on the
Act in the Noma DAME LAwYER, all provisions of the Act, taken to-
gether, decrease union efficiency.
We see, particularly, that Title III is constructed in this same man-
ner. Each section removes power from labor unions or burdens them
in efficient operation. This cannot but reduce their bargaining power
at labor-management discussions. The correction of labor union ills
did not require the reduction of union ability to guarantee labor's
rights. The return to the natural unbalance with the employer in the
position of former advantage cannot help but be inferred from an an-
alysis of the Taft-Hartley Act. Those licenses of laissez-faire capital-
ism allowed to the employer are once again returned in the guise of the
protection of employer rights.
To descend to particulars is to quibble over terms. Labor attacks
these capitalistic incidents as licenses, management claims them as
rights. But the over-all effect as to the production and just distri-
bution of wealth guaranteed under the Wagner Act, threatens to be de-
stroyed with the return of employer supremacy under the Taft-Hartley
17 PoPE LEo XfII, ON THE CoND'nro or LABoR.
18 In subsequent issues, the NoTRs DA=E LAwYER intends to review the
Taft-Harfley Act further.
NOTRE DAME LAWYER
Act. If labor unions possess ills, their bargaining power for justice
must not be taken from them to cure these ills lest we revert to the eco-
nomic slavery of the past.
To pretend to suggest the solution to the labor-management prob-
lem would be presumptuous indeed. Amicable and just adjustment of
differences by both labor and management is the only real solution to
the problem. Be this solution but an empty platitude, it is at least an
ideal for which both groups, labor and management, should strive.
Thomas F. Broden
CRIMINAL PROCEDURE - POST-CONVICTION HEARINGS - THE
ILLINOIS SITUATION.-Illinois criminal procedure in the matter of post-
conviction hearings has recently been labeled by the Supreme Court of
the United States as a "procedural labyrinth made up entirely of blind
alleys." 1 Composing the labyrinth are the so-called alleys of "writ
of error," "habeas corpus" and the "statutory motion in the nature of
the common law writ of error coram nobis." These are the Illinois
state remedies available when an accused has supposedly been convicted
by a state court in deprivation of a right guaranteed by the Constitu-
tion. It is the charge of the United States Supreme Court, however,
that the remedies are available in theory only. Grounding the charge
is the court docket record for the terms 1944, 1945 and 1946 which re-
veals the disproportionate number of petitions for certiorari to review
Illinois' refusals to grant relief, and frequently to grant even a hearing.
2
So that this procedural difficulty may be understood, it is well to ex-
amine the factual situation which prompted the Supreme Court's ad-
monition. In 1925, petitioner, Tony Marino, was arraigned in open
court on charge of murder. At the time he was eighteen years old,
had been in this country only two years, and did not understand the
English language. He was advised of the meaning of the plea of guilty
through interpreters, one of whom was the arresting officer. The com-
mon law record recited that petitioner signed a statement waiving jury
trial and pleading guilty. The waiver was not in fact signed by him
1 Mr. Justice Rutledge concurring in Marino v. Ragen, .... U. S ..... , 68 S. Ct.
240, 92 L. Ed. 203 (1947).
2 "During the last three terms we have been flooded with petitions from Illi-
nois alleging deprivation of due process and other constitutional rights. Thus in
the 1944 term out of a total of 339 petitions filed in forma pauperis, almost all
by prisoners, 141 came from Illinois; in the 1945 term 175 of 393 were from Illi-
nois; and in the 1946 term, 322 out of 528 came from that state." Mr. Justice
Rutledge concurring in Marino v. Ragen, .... U. S....., 68 S. Ct. 240, 242 (1947).
NOTES
and no plea of guilty was entered at the trial. No attorney was ap-
pointed to represent him. He was sentenced to life imprisonment. Pe-
titioner sought a writ of habeas corpus in the circuit court of Winne-
bago County, Illinois, alleging that his conviction was the result of a
denial of his rights under the Federal Constitution. The writ was
quashed. In the United States Supreme Court, on petition for a writ
of certiorari to the circuit court, the Attorney General of the State of
Illinois conceded that habeas corpus is an appropriate remedy in the
state court to correct a denial of due process. On this set of facts the
Supreme Court vacated the judgment of the circuit court and remand-
ed the cause. It was held that petitioner was denied the due process
of law which the Fourteenth amendment requires.3
In order better to realize the Illinois problem it is important to under-
stand the appeal procedure in such a situation. Had not the Illinois
Attorney General made a concession of error, the petition for certiorari
would have been denied.4 The rule is thus stated by the Supreme Court:
We have adhered consistently to the practice of not entertain-
ing such a petition when it seemed to appear that the applicant
had not sought the appropriate state remedy. (cases cited).
And as a corollary of this practice, we have insisted that the
federal courts deny a hearing to an applicant for habeas cor-
pus who has not exhausted his state remedy. (cases cited). This
rule requiring exhaustion of state remedies as a condition prec-
edent to federal relief has been firmly established by repeated
decisions of this court. Even in extreme situations its applica-
tion has been justified by sound administrative procedure.
(cases cited) 5
This law, had not Illinois conceded error, would have denied petitioner
Marino certiorari and would have sent him back to the Illinois courts
to exhaust state remedies. And in the light of the lower court history
in this case and in other cases of like nature, Marino would get exactly
nowhere.
In "An Open Letter to the Attorney General of Illinois," 6 John P.
Wilson, Professor of Law and Dean of the University of Chicago Law
3 Marino v. Ragen, .... U. S ..... 68 S. Ct. 240, 92 L. Ed. 203 (1947). Noted in
23 NonPx DAmm LAWYER 398.4 "But for the state's confession of error, our usual practice in these cases
would lead us to assume that the denial had been on the ground that habeas
corpus was not the appropriate state remedy." See footnote 3 to the concurring
opinion of Mr. justice Rutledge in Marino v. Ragen, .... U. S ...... , 68 S. Ct. 240,
at page 243 (1947).
5 Mr. justice Rutledge concurring in Marino v. Ragen, .... U. S ..... , 68 S. Ct.
240, 242 (1947).
6 See the excellent article by Dean Wilson, An Open Letter to the Attorney
General of Illinois, 15 U. op CHI. L. REv. 251 (1948).
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School, reviews the record and the position of the State of Illinois by
its Attorney General in the Marino case and others of the same type.
Dean Wilson wrote:
Mr. Attorney General: ... In the "confession of error" sub-
mitted by you to the United States Supreme Court you admit-
ted (on the merits) that the decision quashing the writ of
habeas corpus violated the rule that "due process of law in a
capital criminal case requires the appointment of counsel by a
trial court where it appears that the accused is ignorant of trial
procedure and incapable of understanding the English language
before the court can accept a plea of guilty." . . . But was it
not misleading, Mr. Attorney General, to say that you have
always made this concession when in this very case you signed
a return stating, "that if the relator has any recourse it is by
the statutory remedy of a motion in the nature of a writ
of error coram nobis"?
The quote is significant in its showing that even the Attorney General,
the law enforcing officer of the state, is lost in the labyrinth. The con-
clusion must be that Illinois offers no adequate remedy to one in Ma-
rino's position. A study of the remedies as they now exist may provide
the solution.7
Conditions requisite to review by writ of error are: 1. That petition
for the writ be made within the limitation period of twenty years;8 2.
A bill of exceptions must have been filed or the review is limited to mat-
ters in the common law record; 9 and 3. A bill of exceptions must be
preserved within fifty days after judgment is entered. 10 Could one
in the position of Tony Marino satisfy these requisites? Obviously
notl Marino, who was not represented by counsel, had no way of ob-
taining in fifty days the information that he must file a bill of excep-
tions. He would thus be required to rely on the common law record
alone in such a review. The common law record will seldom show any
violation of due process. And since the record cannot be contradicted
or amended,"- the conviction would be sustained. Although it would
7 36 ILL NoIs BAR JouRNAL 356 (1947).
8 People v. Murphy, 296 Ill. 532, 129 N. E. 868 (1921).
9 People v. Foster et al, 394 Ill. 194, 68 N. E. (2d) 252 (1946). Foster, who
was convicted of the crimes of burglary and larceny in 1935 brought error to the
Supreme Court of Illinois contending, among other things, that he had been de-
nied due process of law at the trial. The court said: "Nothing appears in the com-
mon law record to indicate that Foster did not have the fair trial which the law
contemplates. The cause being here on the common law record, the extent of in-
quiry is circumscribed by what the record contains." (emphasis supplied).
10 IL.. REv. STAT. c 110, § 299.70A (1947).
11 People v. Haupris, 396 Ill. 208, 71 N.E. (2d) 68 (1947). Haupris, who was
convicted of murder, brought error. Appended to the common law record was a
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not be correct to make the blanket statement that such a remedy
would be inadequate in all cases, it is apparent that the stringent requi-
sites would make it impossible for most prisoners, not well acquainted
with Illinois criminal procedure, to find relief in a writ of error.
A statutory motion in the nature of a writ of error coram nobis
would be next available to the prisoner.' 2 The effect of this motion is
to present factual questions which were not known to the trial court,
which do not conflict with the jury findings and which the prisoner fail-
ed to raise because of excusable mistake on his part. Additional requi-
sites to the motion are: 1. That the errors relied on were not a mat-
ter of record and were not before the court at, the time of the trial, 1
and 2. That the motion is made within the five year limitation period.14
Here again, one in Marino's position would have little success. A pris-
oner not represented by counsel could hardly be expected to be aware
of the technical requirements. Also, the fact that Marino was not rep-
resented by counsel in accordance with what he claims was due process,
would be known to the trial court, thus precluding a post-conviction
coram nobis hearing.
Applications for habeas corpus constitute another series of possible
remedies. For habeas corpus to be proper, it must appear that petition-
er is challenging the jurisdiction of the convicting court (a challenge of
jurisdiction over the person or subject matter),' 5 or it must be shown
that events arising subsequent to the trial would nullify the conviction. 16
Marino's allegation that he was denied due process does not fall within
either requirement. Habeas corpus was thus improper. The conten-
tion of the Illinois Attorney General that habeas corpus is the appropri-
ate remedy in a case like Marino's is clearly in contradiction to Illinois
letter favorable to the petitioner's case. The court held the letter to be inadmis-
sable saying, "The record itself imports verity and can neither be contradicted nor
amended except by other matter or record by or under the authority of the court."
12 ILL. REv. STAT. c. 110, § 196 (1947).
18 People v. Rave, 392 Ill. 435, 65 N.E. (2d) 23. (1946). George Rave was
convicted of robbery'and filed a petition in the nature of a writ of error coram
nobis seeking to review and set aside the judgment. The petition was denied and
Rave brought error. In affirming the judgement the court said: "The purpose of
the writ of coram nobis is to bring before the court rendering the judgment mat-
ters of fact not appearing. of record which if known at the time the judgment
was rendered would have prevented its rendition". (emphasis supplied).
14 Imi. REv. STAT. c. 110, § 196 (1947).
15 People ex rel Thompson v. Nierstheimer, 395 IlI. 572, 71 N. E. (2d) 343
(1947). In denying the petition of Nierstheimer the court remarked: 'Where
petition for leave to file original petition for writ of habeas corpus alleged errors
that occurred in the trial of the case but failed to set forth any fact showing lack
of jurisdiction of either subject matter or of person, leave to file original petition
for writ of habeas corpus would be denied". (emphasis supplied).
16 People ex rel Courtney v. Thompson, 358 Ill. 81, 192 N.E. 693 (1934).
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law. Further evidence of the inadequacy of habeas corpus is the Illi-
nois Supreme Court record which shows that such petitions are uni-
formly and consistently denied. 17
One question remains: Does a prisoner who is convicted in' denial of
a constitutional right have any other recourse? As a final move, after
petitions for habeas corpus have been denied, the prisoner may petition
for certiorari in the United States Supreme Court. But, as has been
previously pointed out, such petitions are denied unless, as in the Ma-
rino case, the state confesses error. Regardless, the prisoner must make
this petition to satisfy the rule on exhaustion of state remedies. After
this has been done, federal district courts have power to grant writs of
habeas corpus to those confined without due process.' 8 This affords a
semblance of remedy, but, before it becomes available, the prisoner
must wander aimlessly through the passageways of the Illinois "proce-
dural labyrinth."
This brief study of existing remedies is sufficient to show that the
State of Illinois has an inadequate criminal procedure in the matter of
post-conviction hearings. What is the solution? Of the many which
have been suggested, the following stand out: 1. The judiciary could
admit that Illinois is without adequate state remedy so that those im-
prisoned in violation of constitutional rights could apply directly to the
federal courts for habeas corpus; 19 2. To hold that habeas corpus
is a proper remedy where there has been a conviction without due
process; 20 and 3. To expand the remedy of coram nobis to include
a review of facts within the knowledge of the convicting court when
such facts amount to a deprivation of due process of law. The sug-
gested solutions would no doubt be effective, but legislative action would
be desirable. To leave the solution in the hands of the judiciary would
not be wise considering the record. Illinois courts, without giving reas-
ons, have, time and time again, denied applications for leave to file pe-
titions for habeas corpus. It is fair to conclude that Illinois courts do
not wish to be troubled with such petitions.
21
The Illinois "procedural labyrinth" must be leveled to the ground.
Obstructions must be cleared away. The existing "blind alleys" of
11 "When the Illinois Supreme Court was deluged with applications for leave
to file petitions for original habeas corpus writs, it addpted a procedure of deny-
ing such leave without requiring an answer, without appointing counsel to repre-
sent petitioners and without giving reasons for its action." A Study of the Illinois
Supreme Court, 15 U. or CHr. L. REv. 107, 120 (1947).
18 Ex Parte Hawk, 321 U.S. 114, 64 S.Ct. 448, 88 L.Ed. 572 (1944).
19 36 ILINOI s BAR JOURNAL at 356, (1947).
20 A Study of the Illinois Supreme Court, op. cit. supra, note 17; Comment
42 IL. L. REv. 329 (1947).
21 Op. cit. supra, note 17.
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"writ of error", "coram nobis", and "habeas corpus" must be recon-
structed to permit straightforward passage. If this work of reconstruc-
tion fails to assure an adequate post-conviction hearing to one deprived
of his liberty without due process of law, then the Illinois State Legis-
lature must construct a fourth passageway specially designed for "Tony
Marinos."
James A. Cassidy
CONSTITUTIoNAL LAw-CommuNIsm's CRImiNALITY.-Man's inces-
sant struggle against the dominance of the state continues unabated,
just as does the correlated struggle of law against anarchy. The po-
litical school of communism, today's foremost advocate of the superior-
ity of the state, has undertaken the propagation and application of its
doctrine, by whatever means are most expedient, with an ambition un-
precedented in the history of civilization. In the United States this
doctrine is represented and advanced by the Communist Party. Inter-
national and domestic developments of the past year have necessitated
a re-examination of the relation of the Communist Party to the law of
the land. The urgency of the task is great.
The foreign policy known as the Truman Doctrine has met with
appreciable success in, at least temporarily, slowing the westward po-
litical advance of the U. S. S. R. There has been no parallel success
by our domestic policy and law against the threats of the local Com-
munist Party. The problem presses for a solution not because the com-
munists in America are of any great number I nor because there is any
immediate chance of their gaining political ascendency by election; it is
rather because the Communist Party is attempting so to operate that,
should the U. S. S. R. decide it was safe to attack the United States
and/or should revolution within the United States be advisable, the
party would be an available tactical politico-military force well within
the vitals of the U. S. and at the command of the General Staff of the
Russian Army. In the causes of the spread of this diabolical doctrine 2
lies the only key to its defeat. Only a positive social program as com-
manded by the law of nature can finally uproot this poisonous vine. As
an incidental move, however, in the current struggle, stronger legislative
action has been deemed advisable.
The Subcommittee on Legislation, under chairmanship of Rep. Rich-
ard M. Nixon, of the House Committee on Un-American Activities, re-
1 34 A. B. A. JoURN. 30 (Jan. 1948) quotes The Associated Press as saying
that, according to Army "orientation" information, there are 74,0000 Communist
Party members in the United States.
. 2 ENcYc.. ArTu ic CorulmUNsm (Divini Redemptoris), 1937. PIus XI.
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cently completed two months of hearings and study, which were begun
only after exhaustive investigations, relative to proposals which would
outlaw or in some other way curb the Communist Party in the United
States.3 Of the two bills most seriously considered one (H.R. 4581)
provided for the outlawing of the Communist Party and the other (H.R.
4422) provided for the exposure of its propaganda activities. The for-
mer bill 4 noted that communism is
... not a political party, but is an international conspiracy and
an anti-religious idealogy which advocates and practices deceit,
confusion, subversion, revolution, and the subordination of
man to the state, and which has for its purposes and intentions
the overthrow of any democratic or other form of government
by force and violence, if necessary; ...
The second bill 5 provided for the registration of the Communist
Party and "Communist-front organizations" as agents of a foreign prin-
ciple and for a labeling of their propaganda releases. As an outgrowth
of the hearings a bill , was drawn up by the Subcommittee which in-
cluded the major provisions of the latter aforementioned proposal. One
of the main difficulties is the definition of a "front" organization-and
it is essential to prevent the subjects from avoiding the operation of the
law by the simple device of abandoning the name "Communist Party".
The bill (H.R. 5852), likely to succeed in passage, defines a "front
organization" as one, among others, acting with intent to the "... briig-
ing about replacement of free private enterprise in the United States
with a Communist economic system,. . ." This clause, leaving so much
interpretative discretion to the judiciary as to just was is "a Com-
munist economic system", unless the legislative history is clear on the
matter, represents the difficulty faced by all legislation of this type.
(There is nothing to be found in the Constitution which guarantees
the continuance of a "free private enterprise.") Unfortunately there
are those in this country who would readily define even public utilities
as "communist". The necessities of the situation must not be allowed
to minimize the danger to civil rights which is possible in any adequate
legislation. 7 Neither, however, must one assume that this presents in-
superable obstacles to the erection of safeguards against the immediate
dangers threatening. If, for example, such a bill is to become law, then
3 Hearings before the Subcommittee on Legislation of the Committee on Un-American Activities, House of Representatives, 80th Cong. 2d Sess. (1948), Here-
after called Hearings.
4 H. R. 4581, 80th Cong., 1st Sess. (1947).
5 H. R. 4422, 80th Cong., 1st Sess. (1947).
6 H. R. 5852, 80th Cong., 2d Sess. (1948).
7 Statement of John Foster Dulles to the Subcommittee On Legislation (here-
inafter referred to as the Subcommittee), Hearings, pp. 492, 493.
NOTES
the enacting Congress must make fully clear that all "leftist" organiza-
tions are not included. This step is necessary in view of the vernacular
connotation of "left" and "right" and the fact that communism is des-
ignated as "leftist". It is apparent to all observers that the "left" is
providing the most effective of the communists' opposition. But the dan-
ger to liberal groups, while real, is not unavoidable. Sound statutory
draftsmanship must provide the necessary safeguards for the liberal
factions.
The history of the United States' dealings with the "domestic"
Communist Party offers few guides to the solution of so unique a prob-
lem. A free press and speech have overcome the political appeal of
communism, freedom of religion has overcome any idealogical appeal
it might have had and, with all its glaring defects, our economic system
has (with the help of the people through their government) been suf-
ficiently vigorous to overcome the economic appeal of communism.
These institutions have been so effective that the power of the com-
munists for any legitimate action is virtually nil. The problem today
is to overcome the "fifth column" and/or revolutionary potential of the
Communist Party within the limits of the Constitution and without the
impairment of any man's natural rights.
Mediocre success met the legislative efforts of the various states of
the Union to control criminal syndicalism. These efforts offer little aid,
primarily because that problem is not the present one. That issue is
of interest only as the first domestic question in which the communists
took part. Currently the communists are outlawed, as a political party,
in some nine states 8 (Ala., Ark., Ill., Kan., Ohio, Okla., Ore., Tenn., and
Wis.). Some states 9 apparently deny the Communist Party a place
on the ballot even though it is not an illegal organization. Four 10
states require the "Party" to file affidavits to the effect that it does not
advocate the overthrow of the government by force or violence, before
being permitted to register on the ballot. Bills are pending at this
writing in three state legislatures 11 which would bar communists from
public office. Criminal syndicalism statutes remain on at least five
of the state statute books.12 Many states have no statutes capable of
exercising any real control of the communists. The unreasonableness of
relying on the inadequacy of such patch-quilt action is clear, particularly
since the power to ". . . guarantee to every state in this Union a re-
8 Report on the status of the C. P. in various states -by Robert B. Gaston,
Staff of Committee on Un-American Activities, Hearings, p. 455.
9. See testimony of Raymond Moley, Hearings, p. 297.
10 Note 9 supra, re Delaware, Indiana, Ohio and Tennessee.
11 Note 9 suPra, re. Mississippi, Missouri, and Wyoming.
12 Note 9 suPra, re. Alabama, Montana, North Carolina, Rhode Island, Ore-
gon and, also, T. Alaska.
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publican form of government, .. . is so explicitly granted the federal
government.13
Federal action, to date, has consisted primarily of more or less abor-
tive attempts, by statute, to control the immigration of communists, the
search for any "conspiracy", and the dismissal of disloyal employees of
the federal government. Although the House Subcommittee recommend-
ed ".... a number of stiffening changes in existing laws covering immi-
gration, naturalization, and passport travel.. ." 1 The real emphasis is
on the danger from native communists. One of the more meaningful of
the present federal statutes is that which provides criminal penalty for
anyone, other than diplomats and consuls, who acts in the U. S. as an
agent of a foreign power, unless he has given notice of the fact to the
Secretary of State.'5 Vigorous enforcement of the letter and spirit of
this congressional mandate could do much to alleviate the prevailing
danger.
Although subject to much deserved criticism, the dismissal of "dis-
loyal governmental employees has undoubtedly increased the function-
ing security of the government. At this writing the decision of the
Attorney General as to the subversiveness of good faith of an organiza-
tion is final. If the decision is against an organization its members are
presumed un-American. Legislation providing for an appeal of this
decision to the courts is now under consideration. Regarding the right
to privacy, as involved in questioning of governmental employees and
those in key communication media, by both congressional committees
and the Executive, there has been much constructive comment.' 6 One
very meaningful observation with regard to the questioning of cinema
writers is worthy of note: 17
It has been argued, with a curious disregard of moral prin-
ciples, that Communist writers have a constitutional right to
conceal their opinions because, if their communism were
known, they would lose their highly paid employments. This
is a brazen claim that a man has a constitutional right to ob-
tain and to hold a job by fraud-by concealing his disqualifi-
cations from his employer.
In the U. S. Code there is to be found another act which might be
of use in the present situation. Conspiracy statutes, essentially the
'3 U. S. CONST. ART. IV, § 4.
14 N. Y. Times, April 6, 1948, p. 1.
15 54 STAT. 80 (1940), 22 U. S. C. 601 (1947 Supp).
6 Note, 23 NoTRE DAmm LAWYER 353 (1948).
1 Donald R. Richberg, Washington Sunday Star, Dec. 7, 1947, pp. 1-3, re-
printed in Hearings 59.
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same as the present one have been in force since 1867.18 The present
statute reads, in part: 19
If two or more persons conspire either to commit any offense
against the United States, or to defraud the United States in
any manner or for any purpose, and one or more of such par-
ties do any act to effect the object of the conspiracy, each of
the parties to such conspiracy shall be fined not more than
$10,000, or imprisoned not more than two years, or both.
In view of its terms, which have a known common law meaning, and
its definition of the offenses prohibited, there is sufficient certainty in the
Act. Its validity is established,20 although it must be strictly con-
strued.2 1 It has been judicially declared 22 that the statute is suffici-
ently broad to include conspiracy for the purpose of impairing, obstruct-
ing or defeating the lawful function of any governmental department.
Regarding the Communist Party, it is objected that the difficulty of
proof is prohibitive. But if, upon sufficient evidence, the jury is satis-
fied that two or more persons agreed to do an unlawful act or design
and committed some act to further it-conspiracy is proven.28  At
common law not even proof of an overt act was necessary for a con-
spiracy conviction,24 and there are indications of like result under the
statute,25 but proof of the conspiracy has to be clear. But it is still
not required that more than one of the conspirators take part in the
overt act.26 Thus it would seem that, if the members of the Commu-
nist Party subscribe to the Manifesto, as they claim, only a judicial
misconstruction of the statute could exempt them from conviction, once
any act in furtherance of their program was committed. It is not even
necessary that there be any formal agreement between the parties to a
conspiracy, if they work together understandingly, by common plan, to
a mutual goal.27 If the communists' contention be that they plan no
crime against declared law, it is well to recall that the act conspired for
commission need not be one against a statute. 28  But in any case the
argument is of small weight in view of related, pertinent legislation on
18 REv. STAT. § 5440 (1875).
19 52 STAT. 197 (1938), 18 U. S. C. A. § 80 (1947 Supp.).
20 Crawford v. United States, 212 U. S. 183, 29 S. Ct. 260, 53 L. Ed. 183
(1907).
21 United States v. Robbins, 157 Fed. 999 (D. C. Utah 1907).
22 Hass v. Henkel, 216 U. S. 462, 30 S. Ct. 249, 54 L. Ed. 569 17 Ann. Cas.
(1910).
23 United States v. Barrett, 65 Fed. 62 (C. C. S. C. 1894).
24 Robinson v. United States, 172 Fed. 105 (C. C. A. 8th 1909).
25 Orear v. United States. 261 Fed. 257 (C. C. A. 5th 1919).
26 Williams v. United States, 3 F. (2d) 933 (C. C. A. 6th 1925).
27 Fowler v. United States, 273 Fed. 15 (C. C. A. 9th 1921).
28 United States v. Raley, 173 Fed. 159 (D. C. Or. 1909).
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the subject of conspiracies to overthrow the federal government by force
and violence. These 29 forbid anyone to "... abet, advise or teach..."
these actions, orally or "... by written or printed matter ." It is
declared illegal:
To organize or help organize any society, group, or assembly
of persons who teach, advocate, or encourage the overthrow
or destruction of any government in the United States by
force or violence; or to be or become a member of, or affiliated
with, any such group, society, or assembly of persons, know-
ing the purpose thereof.
It is difficult to envision any defense by the communists to prosecution
under these statutes, if prosecutions were made. Since, however, even
in view of these enactments the Communist Party carries forward its
mission practically unrestrained, the Subcommittee is submitting to the
Committee the bill aforementioned. The registration provisions are un-
doubtedly constitutional. A New York statute requiring registration of
the Ku Klux Klan with the State Attorney General was held 30 not
to be discriminatory within the federal constitutional definition, nor
violative of the civil rights of the members. The legitimate goal of
the present Bill (H.R. 5852) is indicated by the reason it gives for the
necessity:
... it is a matter of common knowledge that the subversive
forces of communism are endeavoring in the United States as
well as elsewhere, by devious and unscrupulous methods, to
undermine democratic governments and institutions.
Perhaps, if the Bill becomes law, it will restrict the activities of the
Communist Party, but it cannot solve the basic problem, for it is not so
aimed.
This then is the law of the states and nation covering this vital mat-
ter. There has arisen, in the past year, the question of the advisibility
and constitutionality of a legislative declaration of the illegality of the
Communist Party and its activities. The expediency of such a move, in
view of all the noted circumstances, is chiefly a problem of political
science but the legality of the step is a problem of constitutional law.
Any legislation outlawing the Communist Party must be exceedingly
cautious that it infringes none of man's fundamental freedoms. True,
the organization is in no Anglo-American sense a political party--even
the dictionary 8 1 defines it as only a "semipolitical party"-but, if
due process of law is to be retained, in both its substantive and pro-
29 54 Stat. 671 (1940), 18 U. S. C. § 10 (Supp. 1947).
30 Bryant v. Zimmerman, 278 T. S. 63, 49 S. Ct. 61, 73 L. Ed. 184 (1928).
31 WEBSTER'S CoLLGiATE DIcTIoyARY, 5th Ed. (1946).
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cedural aspects, the safeguards must be adequate. Many learned mem-
bers of the bar question the constitutionality of any outlawing act.
They base their dissent on the firm ground of civil liberties.
If any such statute is to escape the lethal brand of repugnance it
must first of all meet the test of bill of attainder,3 2 or legislative trial.
The Supreme Court of the United States has recently held33 that a
statute attempting to punish a group or its members, without judicial
trial, is within the constitutional ban on bills of attainder. The national
legislators must keep in mind that they may say what is illegal and
decree its sanction but they can not apply that law to any man or pun-
ish the breach.3
A decision of the Federal Supreme Court, rendered in the war year
of 1943, on the case of Schneiderman v. United States,85 while impor-
tant to the suggested outlawing statute, does not predetermine its consti-
tutionality. The case involved a governmental attempt to revoke and
cancel the citizenship of one who had been naturalized, on the grounds
that he was a member of the Communist Party. Upon naturalization,
he had taken the oath of allegiance to the United States and the Con-
stitution. The Court found for the defendant holding:
... we do not think that the Government has carried its bur-
den of proving by evidence which does not leave the issue in
doubt that petitioner was not in fact attached to the principles
of the Constitution and well disposed to the good order and
happiness of the United States when he was naturalized in
1927.
There is no holding in the case that the Communist Party does not advo-
cate unlawful means of social change but merely that on the facts and
statutory law available there would be no judicial notice of the facts.
This position of the Supreme Court is not at all typical of the (then
and now) occupants of that bench. In fact, the incumbent jurists have
been widely acclaimed for their solicitude for human rights and human
dignity. The history of the Communist Party belies the necessity for
proof of its intentions. As the late Chief Justice Stone pointed out, in
his dissenting opinion ". . . the end contemplated was the overthrow
of governments and the measures advocated were force and violence."
The holding in the Schneiderman case has met with severe and ma-
82 Or, technically, a "bill of pains and penalties", since no question of capital
punishment is involved, BLAcx's LAw DICToNARY, 3rd. Ed. (1933) at p. 164.
33 United States v. Lovett, 328 U. S. 303, 66 S. Ct. 1073, 90 L. Ed. 1252
(1946).
34 Cummings v. Missouri, 4 Wall. 277, 71 U. S. 356 (1867); Ex Parte Gar-
land, 4 Wall. 333, 71 U. S. 366 (1867); Duncan v. Kahanamokv, 327 U. S. 304,
66 S. Ct. 606, 90 L. Ed. 688 (1945).
35 320 U. S. 118, 63 S. Ct. 1333, 87 L. Ed. 1796 (1943).
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terial criticism and it is to be hoped that it is not long for this world.
One critic 36 suggested that the case hung on the paradox of American
citizenship and communism, observing that,
... as long as the principle of contradiction remains axiomatic
in reasoning, and the doctrine that the end justifies any means
anathematized in law as well as morality, it seems competent
to question the sincerity of the petitioner in professing attach-
ment to the Constitution without renouncing his affiliation with
an organization which is.. . opposed to our charter of political
philosophy.
Another, more recent, comment 37 was, ... I think that the Supreme
Court of the United States would be amply justified by investigations
and proof which have come forward since the determination of the
Schneiderman case in reversing all the holdings of the Schneiderman
case.. ." as they regard Communism.
Assuming arguendo, that a legislative declaration of the illegality of
the Communist Party would abridge certain of the constitutionally pro-
tected rights of its members--the question is presented under what cir-
cumstances such an abridgment is allowable. In Schenk v. United
States,38 a conviction for printing and distributing handbills advocating
resistance to the draft was upheld, the Court holding that such acts in
time of war constituted such a "clear and present danger" to the security
of the nation that the abridgment of constitutional rights was justified.
Thus was established the "clear and present danger" rule. It would
seem, as was pointed out by one of the legal scholars 39 testifying re-
cently before the Subcommittee, that in forming legislation to disarm
the Communist Party ". . . we will be working against a clear and
present danger. . ." The "clear and present" danger phrase is reason-
ably but not broadly construed. The Supreme Court of the United
States4 has denied that freedom of speech protects those who advo-
cate the destruction of our parliamentary system by methods of force
and violence, reiterating a basic rule of political civilization: "A State
may punish utterances endangering the foundations of organized gov-
86 Note, 32 GEo. L. J. 405 (1944), reprinted in Hearings, p. 458.
37 Statement of Donald R. Richberg, Hearings, 77.
88 249 U. S. 47, 39 S. Ct. 247, 63 L. Ed. 470 (1919). See also Bridges v. Cali-
fornia, 314 U. S. 252, 62 S. Ct. 190, 86 L. Ed. 192 (1941); Carlson v. California,
310 U. S. 106, 60 S. Ct. 746, 84 L. Ed. 1104 (1940); Thornhil v. Alabama, 310
U. S. 88, 60 S. Ct. 736, 84 L. Ed. 1093 (1940); See dissent of Mr. justice Brandeis
in Whitney v. California, 274 U. S. 357, 47 S. Ct. 641, 71 L. Ed. 1095 (1927).
39 Testimony of Dr. Charles S. Collier, Hearings, 184, 187.
4o Gitlow v. State of New York, 268 U. S. 652, 45 S. Ct. 625, 69 L. Ed. 1138
(1925); see also State v. Moilen, 140 Minn. 112, 167 N. W. 345, 1 A. L. R. 331,
336 (1918); State v. Diamond, 27 N. M. 477, 202 Pac. 988, 20 A. L. R. 1527, 1535
(1921).
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ernment and threatening its overthrow by unlawful means." The right
of law whether state or national to ". prevent the overthrow of the
Government by force and that it may, as a means to these ends, punish
utterances which have a tendency to and are intended to produce the
forbidden results is not open to question." 41 In Stromberg v. Cali-
fornia,4 2 the Supreme Court, speaking through Mr. Chief Justice
Hughes, held that the displaying of a red flag as a symbol of opposition,
by legal and peaceful means, to organized government, is protected as
free speech. Thus the belief in force is a prerequisite to illegality. This
important distinction must always remain.
In sum then the preliminary constitutional considerations make it
clear that the "due-process" clause forbids a conclusive presumption
by legislation of an arbitrary state of facts; 43 and 44 ". . freedom of
speech and of press ... are susceptible of restriction only to prevent
grave and immediate danger to interests which the state may lawfully
protect."
Thus if a legislative presumption of the criminality of membership
is to be created it must be based on sound, apparent fact, clearly stated.
That, if so stated, the freedom of speech enjoyed under the Constitu-
tion will not be found to include the right to advise or solicit crime,4 5
seems probable. Hence the crux of the problem is the nature of the
Communist Party in the United States. Is it by its very nature in-
herently illegal or so dangerous to the Anglo-American system of evolu-
tionary democracy as to be susceptible of such designation? It is ad-
visable, in answer, to note briefly what has been said of communism
and the Communist Party, (a) by competent students of the doctrine,
(b) by the communists themselves, and (c) by the courts. If the con-
sensus be that it is truly a revolutionary organization there is little
doubt of the constitutionality of an outlawing statute.
What have the students of the matter concluded as to the nature of
the Communist Party? The investigating congressional subcommittee,
in its report,46 states:
41 Dunne v. United States, 138 F. (2d) 137 (C. C. A. 8th 1943); See also
Near v. Minnesota, 283 U. S. 697, 51 St. Ct. 625, 75 L. Ed. 1357 (1931).
42 283 U. S. 359, 51 S. Ct. 532, 75 L. Ed. 1117, 73 A. L. R. 1484, 1494 (1931).
43 Manley v. State of Georgia, 279 U. S. 1, 49 S. Ct. 215, 73 L. Ed. 575
(1929).
44 West. Va. Board of Education v. Barnette, 319 U. S. 624, 63 S. Ct. 1178,
87 L. Ed. 1628 (1942).
45 Frohwerk v. United States, 249 U. S. 204, 39 S. Ct. 249, 63 L. Ed. 561
(1919).
46 Report of the Subcommittee on Legislation of the Committee on Un-
American Activities on Proposed Legislation to Control Subversive Communist
Activities in the United States 1, 80th Cong., 2nd Sess. (1948).
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It has been clearly established that the Communist Party of
the United States is not an American political party, but is
actually a disciplined and organic part of the world Communist
movement, which has sections in every nation in the world,
all under the direction and control of . . . the Politburo in
Moscow.
A Canadian commentator 4 7 pointed out that, "The so-called Com-
munist party is no more a political party in our sense of the term, than
were Catiline's conspirators, . . . Coxey's Army or Al Capone's gang."
As early as two years before the writing of the Manifesto the Pope48
styled it ". . . that infamous doctrine . . . absolutely contrary to the
natural law itself.. ." The accuracy of this conclusion has become in-
creasingly clear through the one hundred years of the doctrine's formal
existence.
It is well at this point to recall that virtually since the founding of
the Third Communist International, by the Soviet Union Communist
Party, in Moscow, on March 2, 1919, (allegedly dissolved on May 30,
1943) the Communist Party of the United States was openly affiliated
with it. When, on November 16, 1940 the Party "dissolved" its bond
to the International its sole purpose was the avoidance of the Voorhis
Act.49 On the same day that relations with the International were
"broken", the Communist Party of the United States adopted a resolu-
tion 5o reiterating the ". . . unshakeable adherence of our party to the
principles of prolaterion internationalism in the spirit of its greatest
leaders and teachers, Marx, Engels, Lenin, and Stalin."
It is enlightening to observe just what the "spirit of its greatest
leaders" is. Do the communists deny the charges before noted that they
seek world revolution? Is there any factual basis for a legislative pre-
sumption of the illegality of the Communist Party, per se? If there is
a basis it must be that this "party" subscribes to the violent overthrow
of the government. What do the communists themselves say?
In their Manifesto Marx and Engels state frankly: ".... the Com-
munists everywhere support every revolutionary movement against the
existing social and political order of things." They boast that, "The
Communists disdain to conceal their views and aims. They openly de-
clare that their ends can be attained only by the forceful overthrow of
all existing social conditions." (emphasis supplied). To American
visitors Stalin explained:
47 17 THE FORTNxiHTLY LAW JouRNAL 90 (1947).
48 Pius IX. ENcYcL. Qux PLr Rmus (1846).
49 56 STAT. 251 (1942), 22 U. S. C. A. §§ 611-622 (1947 Supp.).
50 Hearings, p. 6.
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I think the moment is not far off when a revolutionary crisis
will develop in America... It is essential that the American
Communist Party should be capable of meeting that historical
moment fully prepared and of assuming the leadership of the
impending class struggle in America. Every effort and every
means must be employed in preparing for that, comrades.
(emphasis supplied). 5 ' Stalin was following well the belief of his
master, Lenin who had taught 52 that, "... . it is absolutely necessary
for every Communist Party systematically to combine legal with illegal
works, legal with illegal organizations." This then is the "spirit of its
greatest leaders"'to which the Communist Party subscribes. That the
American Communist Party is fully cognizant of its goal was testified by
William Z. Foster while its national chairman.5 8 . He was asked: "Do
the Communists in this country advocate world revolution?" He ans-
wered: "Yes." On another occasion 5 4 the same man admitted that,
"The attitude of the Communists is the abolishing of the American
form of government." Thus the communists admit they are working
by every available means, in complete disregard of justice and law,
for the destruction of this country's political structure.
In the ultimate analysis it will be the courts which will make the
final decision as to the nature of the Communist Party. A glance, there-
fore, at some of the judicial determinations in this regard is not with-
out merit. For liability of deportation of dangerous aliens, a member
of the Communist Party is bound by declaration of purposes and pro-
grams of the Communist International (now called "Cominform"), the
Manifesto and the constitution of the Communist Party of America. 55
However, it seems, that if a member, alien, believes that violence is not
now desirable, his membership will not bind him. 55 There has been
dictum from the federal judiciary to the effect that implementation of
Communist Party policies by orderly amendment is not feasable and
.that ". . . their consummation is impossible short of revolution." 57
Among the lower federal courts it has long been well established that
communism teaches and advocates principles basically opposed to our
Constitution 58 and proposes their application by violent overthrow of
51 Stalin at interview with the First American Labor Delegation, Sept., 9,
1927, printed, Hearings, p. 439.
52 SELECTED WORKS OF LExnx, Vol. X. 172, International Publishers Co., Inc.,
(1943).
53 Testimony before House, Investigating Committee, 1930, reprinted,
Hearings, p. 369.
54 William Z. Foster quoted by Rep. Mcflonough, Hearings, 44.
55 Skeffington v. Katzeff, 277 Fed. 129 (C. C. A. 1st 1922). See also Antolish
v. Paul, 283 Fed. 957 (C. C. A. 7th 1922).
56 Strecker v. Kessler 95 F. (2d) 976 (C. C. A. Sth 1938).
57 In Re Saralleff, 59 F. (2d) 436 (E. D. Mo. 1932).
58 United States v. Tapolesanm, 40 F. (2d) 255 (C. C. A. 3rd 1930).
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the Federal Government.5 9 Membership in the "party" makes one
liable to certain governmental controls, even though the member had
no knowledge of the character of the Communist Party and did not ac-
tually participate in its proceedings.8 0 The adjudications of the state
courts present no such uniformity, although, here too the opinion is
largely in agreement. California has specifically held", that it does
not take judicial notice of the Communist Party's program for violent
overthrow of the governments. The Pennsylvania Supreme Court, on
the other hand, wrote: 82 "What the policy of the Communist Party
is does not appear from the evidence but courts have long recognized
and have taken judicial notice that communism, as a political move-
ment, is dedicated to the overthrow of the Government of the United
States" . . . (and of the states) by force and violence." Most of the
decided state cases are essentially in agreement with the view that
"Marxian Principles", as applied, are such as to make their propagation
a criminal act.8 3 What, in the light of current events, could logically
be considered the beginning of a trend in judicial notice appeared in
the very late (1948) federal decision, National Maritime Union v. Her-
zog.64 It was there held that communist activity in labor unions is
such a danger to the nation that Congress may withhold from a union
the privilege of becoming the exclusive bargaining agent in an industry
unless each officer of said union fulfills the non-communist affidavit 65
requirement of the Taft-Hartley Act. Obiter, the Court noticed, with-
out the introduction of evidence:
The Communist Party is known to be organized for the pur-
pose of promoting throughout the world a program to spread
communism. . . The pattern followed.., is to create economic
unrest . . . Evidence in a judicial proceeding is not needed to
establish these as primary objectives.
This is judicial notice of the most obvious facts.
Lastly the total problem of outlawing or otherwise controlling the
Communist Party must be broached in view of the novelty of the situa-
59 Uncar v. Seaman 4 F (2d) 80 (C. C. A. 8th 1924). See also cases cited
in 32 GEo. L. J. 405 (1943).
60 Ex Parte Bridges, 49 F. Supp. 292 (N. D. Cal. 1943).
61 Communist Party v. Peek, 20 Cal. (2d) 536, 127 P. (2d) 889 (1942).
62 Pawell v. Unemployment Compensation Board of Review, 146 Pa. Sup.
Rep. 147, 22 Ad. (2d) 43 (1941). See also United States v. Wallis, 268 Fed
413 (S. D. N. Y. 1920), Field v. Hall, 77 Ark. 143, 143 S. W. (2d) 567 (1940).
63 In re Lithuanian Workers' Literature Society, 187 N. Y. S. 612 (1921).
64 16 L. W. 2501 (D. D. C. 1948).
65 For a discussion of this statutory requirement see Note, 23 NoTE DAu
LAwYER 238, 248 (1948).
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tion it presents. Communism, like the Ku Klux Klan, is in a state
of perpetual war with our governmental system. However, the Klan,
which is composed primarily of the neurotic dregs of this country, acts
with a domestic scope, while the Communist Party, composed of the
world's most unscrupulous human elements, acts with a world-wide
scope. That which makes the Communist Party more threatening than
the other subversive organizations is its connection, as a tactical unit,
with the U. S. S. R. Thus the problem of the governments, state and
national is unique.
As has been seen, an organization engaging in conspiratorial activity
tending toward the overthrow of the government by force and violence,
particularly when it is the agent of a foreign power, is one against which
government must protect itself. A clear and present danger to society
from such an organization permits the abridgment of what would other-
wise be the rights of the members of the subject organization. By the
observation of reasonable men, by the determination of American courts
of justice and by the assertions of the communists themselves, the
Communist Party in the United States fits completely this pattern for
constitutional illegality. A federal statute declaring the Communist
Party an illegal organization and membership therein criminal, per se,
would be perfectly in accord with the letter and the spirit of the Con-
stitution. 66 It may, in fact, be cogently- argued that the Constitution
commands such action.
However, in view of the difficulty of the legislative problem in-
volved and the doubts as to constitutionality, all attempts at outlawing
the Party, per se, were abandoned by the Subcommittee. A report was
made by the Subcommittee on legislation, to the full Committee, on
the legislation which they proposed. The report, pointed out that the
Communist Party in the United States ... constitutes a clear and pres-
ent danger to our national security . . The report criticised the De-
partment of Justice's ". . . failure to proceed under existing laws.... ." It
is suggested that the states be encouraged to take their own protective
measures-in addition to those of the Federal Goyrenment. The re-
port suggests the provision-in view of the current communist state-
ments denying advocacy of force and violence-that it be necessary only
to prove willful participation in a conspiracy to subvert the welfare of
this country to that of a "foreign Communist power". Suggested legis-
lation is primarily an extension of the existing statutes. Early in May,
1948, a bill was recommended to Congress by the full Committee,
66 In support of this contention see Whitney v. California, 274 U. S. 357, 47
S. Ct. 641, 71 L. Ed. 1095 (1927).
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which embodied these changes. 67 The draftmanship of the bill finally
enacted may do much to determine both its constitutionality and effici-
ency. It may be hoped therefore that this task will be adequately
completed.
There is little serious doubt that the proposed legislation, if drafted
prudently, will be constitutional. Could not a statute declaring the per
se criminality of the Communist Party be founded upon the sound con-
stitutional premises that support statutes "controlling" the Communist
Party?
This is the specific legal action which might be taken against the
domestic operation of international Communism. In a discussion of
such a specific question there is the constant danger that the student
of the total problem will lose the broad perspective requisite to an un-
derstanding of the roots of the present conflict. The long range success
of any country in combatting the idea of communism, which is a potent
negative force, will be determined by that country's ability or will to
fill the vacuums wherein there is no justice to its citizens. Constructive
social law and policy, which is a potent positive force, is the only means
to accomplish this result. Speaking of that just social philosophy oblig-
atory as "the doctrine of the Church." 68 the Pope observed that
"... this doctrine must be consistently reduced to practice in everyday
life. .. ." The Catholic Church has, from the beginning, taught the
immorality of those economic practices of our free enterprise system
which create the justice vacuum in which communism so willingly
thrives. These are such axiomatic wrongs as the unfair labor practices
of child labor, substandard working conditions, inadequate compensa-
tion to workmen, denial of the workers' right to organize, et cetera;
they include the flagrant immorality of "Jim Crowism" and Anti-Sem-
iticism. The true love of the communist is his role as champion of the
oppressed, yet ". . . it was Christianity that first affirmed the real and
universal brotherhood of all men of whatever race or condition." 69
Those justifiably dissatisfied with social conditions would do well to
test the sincerity of the communists by the statement of Stalin, that: 70
... the revolutionist will accept a reform in order to use it as
a means wherewith to link legal work with illegal work, in
order to use it as a screen behind which his illegal activities...
may be intensified."
67 A copy of the bill was not yet available at this writing.
68 EScYCL. ATraSTic Com nsm (Divini Redemptoris) (1937) Pius XI,
speaking of the encyclicals RXRum NOVARUm and QUADRAGESimO ANNO.
69 See Note 66 supra.
70 Quoted by James Burnham in his Struggle For The World, p. 61, noted in
17 Fortnightly Law Journal 90 (1947).
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A program of morality implemented by positive law will help over-
come any threat of communism's "ideals", while a program of adequate
governmental action, not capable of use for fascist excesses, will help
overcome the threat of communism's violence. There is neither reason
nor excuse for the delay of such a program, if we would make secure
the democracy so well defined by a poet as:
Ancient Right unnoticed as the breath
we draw-
Leave to live by no man's leave,
underneath the Law.
John E. Cosgrove
CIVIL RIGHTS-CONSTITUTIONALITY oF FEDERAL ANTILYNCHING
LEGISLATION-On March 23, 1948, -the Judiciary Committee of the
House of Representatives reported to the House I that H.R. 5673 was
a clean bill and recommended its prompt passage. This was the pro-
posed federal antilynching bill which had been introduced in the House
by Representative Case of New Jersey 2 and which had been referred
to the Judiciary Committee for its consideration. In the committee
itself, the question of a federal antilynching bill was already being
considered. Since February 4, Subcommittee No. 4 had been conduct-
ing hearings on fourteen other bills 3 similar to H.R. 5673, and differ-
ing only in certain minor features.4 It was, then, as a result of care-
fully considering all these bills that Mr. Case's bill was finally given
the favorable report previously referred to. Though the report was
favorable, it was by no means unanimous. On legal and other grounds,
the question was hotly contested in the subcommittee hearings, and at-
tached to the committee report was a strong minority report, signed
by eight members of the Judiciary Committee.
The desirability and constitutionality of federal antilynching legis-
lation has, as a matter of fact, long been a question of much specula-
1 H. R. RE. No. 1597, 80th Cong., 2nd Sess. (1948).
2 "A bill for the better assurance of the protection of citizens of the United
States and other persons within the several States from mob violence and lynch-
ing, and for other purposes." Popularly known as "Federal Antilynching Act."
3 H. R. 41, introduced by Mr. Celler; H. R. 57, by Mr. Clason; H. R. 77, by
Mr. Dirkson; H. R. 223, by Mr. Canfield; H. R. 228, by Mr. Dawson; H. R. 278
by Mr. Powell; H. R. 800, by Mrs. Douglas; H. R. 3850, by Mr. Bender; H. R.
4155, by Mr. Bradley; H. R. 4528, by Mr. Keating; and H. R. 4577 by Mr.
Twyman.
4 See Statement of Joseph B. Robinson, American Jewish Congress, on H. R.
3488 and Other Bills to Curb Lynching, as found in Hearing Before Subcommittee
No. 4 of the Judiciary House of Representatives, 80th Cong., 2nd Sess. 118 (1948).
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tion. Since 1900, when Representative White introduced H.R. 6963
in the fifty-sixth Congress, more than 150 bills have been introduced
into Congress. 5 The first really sustained drive for such a bill, how-
ever, did not come until April 11, 1921 when Representative Dyer of
St. Louis, Missouri, introduced H.R. 13, the Dyer antilynching bill.6
It passed the House in January, 1922, by a vote of 230 to 119, but was
filibustered to death in the Republican Senate. It was reintroduced in
succeeding years by Representative Dyer, but it was never again acted
upon.
In 1933 the National Association for the Advancement of Colored
People began mobilizing organizations and individuals in support of
the Wagner-Costigan antilynching bill, sponsored by Senator Robert
F. Wagner (D., N. Y.) and Senator Edward P. Costigan (D., Col.).
Hearings were held before the Senate Judiciary Committee in Feb-
ruary 1934 and broadcast was made over a nation-wide radio network.
But it too was filibustered to death by southern senators and had to be
laid aside. Since that time many other bills have been introduced, only
to meet this or a similar fate.
During the past year, interest in this and other types of civil rights
legislation has received great impetus from the publication of the book,
To Secure These Rights. Both in 7 and out 8 of Congress support for
a federal antilynching bill has grown to such proportions that the pros-
pects for its passage seem brighter than ever.
That lynching does go on in the United States and is a real prob-
lem in this country is too obvious to warrant a thorough discussion.
Nor is it necessary to show in detail that the civil rights of many of
our citizens, primarily the rights of citizens who are in minority groups,
are frequently violated. The question is whether these problems should
be dealt with on the federal level or left to the states. Due to factors
such as the above report and the efforts of such groups as the NAACP,
the conviction is now stronger than ever that it can and should be
done on the federal level. As a result, passage of a federal antilynch-
ing bill seems more likely than ever before, despite the opposition of
many who, for various reasons, still share the conviction that the States
should be left alone to work these problems out for themselves. The
5 The Library of Congress, Legislative Reference Service, Federal Law Sec-
tion, June 13, 1947.
6 The following two paragraphs are based on excerpts from A GENERATION OF
LYNCIwO IN THE UNITED STATES, 1921-46, a supplement to THIRTY YEARS oF
LYNCHING IN THE UNITED STATES, 1889-1918, by the National Association for the
Advancement of Colored People, New York 18, New York.
7 For example, see the senatorial support being mustered for such a bill as
reported in N. Y. Times, April 10, 1948.
8 For example, see N. Y. Times, "Letters to the Times", April 7, 1948.
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opinion of those who share the federal viewpoint is summed up to some
extent in the following excerpt from the message to Congress by the
President in which he transmitted his recommendations for a civil
rights program: 9
A specific Federal measure is needed to deal with the
crime of lynching-against which I cannot speak too strong-
ly. It is a principle of our democracy written into the Con-
stitution, that every person accused of an offense against the
law shall have a fair, orderly trial in an impartial court. We
have made great progress toward this end, but I regret to say
that lynching has not yet finally disappeared from our land.
So long as one person walks in fear of lynching, we shall not
have achieved equal justice under law. I call upon Congress
to take decisive action against this crime.
The decline in lynchings, referred to in the above quotation, is also
brought out in the statement made by Mrs. Douglas to the subcom-
mittee.1 0 In it, she points out that of the 4,717 known lynchings since
1882 and the 1,967 since 1900, there was only one in 1947. This fact
has been seized upon by opponents of federal antilynching legislation
as proof for their contention that it can be solved without what they
term "federal interference in state affairs." But proponents of federal
legislation point out that there were thirty-one attempted lynchings
that year, and they contend that fear of just such federal legislation has
tended to produce better enforcement by state and local officials of
state antilynching laws.
Throughout this struggle it should be noted that even among those
farthest removed from prejudice, and also among liberal groups in the
South and elsewhere, there is opposition to such a federal program.
For, in addition to emotional factors, there are other considerations in-
volved in such opposition, one of the strongest of which is the idea in
the South that enactment of such legislation tends to bring on the re-
construction era all over again. The Honorable Eugene Cook, At-
torrey General of Georgia, in a speech before the Lamar School of
Law of Emory University, delivered March 4, 1948, put it this way:
One characteristic of Southerners is their reluctance to be
forced into anything, even for their own good. It was a com-
mon saying after the War Between the States, when federal
statutes attempted to force repugnant practices on our State,
that "I can be restored to the Union, but I can't be recon-
structed into it." Someone ought to tell Congress that recon-
struction has been tried and abandoned.
9 H. R. Doc. No. 516, 80th Cong., 1st Sess. (1947).
10 Hearings Before Subcommittee No. 4, 80th Cong., 2nd Sess., 39 (1948),
supra note 4.
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But regardless of all the arguments pro and con," it is generally
recognized that, as Mr. Cook stated in the same speech, "Lynching may
be a problem arising from emotions; but antilynching control is a legal
proposition." (Italics supplied.) Hence the biggest controversy rag-
ing at the present time is whether or not a federal antilynching law is
constitutional.
In support of its constitutionality, its proponents rely chiefly on the
Fourteenth Amendment, as section one of H.R. 5673 states,1 2 although
not in such a way as to intend to exclude other constitutional bases
which may also exist for such action. For example, Section One of the
Fourteenth Amendment provides in part: ". . . nor shall any State
deprive any person of life, liberty, or property without due process of
law; nor deny to any person within its jurisdiction the equal protection
of the laws." It is contended that 'this provision is violated by state
inaction and acquiescence in lynch law and mob violence. It is pointed
out that inaction is just as much a violation of this amendment as
affirmative action. It is insisted that United States v. Cruikshank,'3 and
United States v. Harris,'4 two cases often cited by opponents of federal
control, are not applicable because they merely hold that the various
attempts by Congress to prevent the deprivation of civil rights by pri-
vate individuals alone without state sanction or authority are uncon-
stitutional.
In the Cruikshank case, the defendants were jointly indicted under
an act 15 which made it a felony for two or more persons to conspire
"to injure, oppress, threaten, or intimidate any citizen, with intent to
prevent or hinder his free exercise and enjoyment of any right or privi-
lege granted or secured to him by the Constitution or laws of the
United States." The Court held that the right to equal protection of
the laws under the Fourteenth Amendment does not "add anything to
the rights which one citizen has under the Constitution against an-
other," and that the duty to protect all citizens was one originally as-
sumed by the several states and remains there, the only obligation on
the United States being that of seeing that the states do not deny
"1 A good summary of the arguments in addition to the legal aspects against
federal antilynching legislation can be found in H. R. REP. No. 1597, 80th Cong.
2nd Sess., 9-20 (1948) (Minority Views).
12 ". . . the provisions of this Act are enacted in exercise of the power of
Congress to enforce, by appropriate legislation, the provisions of the fourteenth
amendment to the Constitution of the United States under said amendment equal
protection and due process of law to all persons charged with or suspected or con-
victed of any offense within their jurisdiction."
'3 92 U. S. 542, 23 L. Ed. 588 (1875).
14 106 U. S. 629, 1 S. Ct. 601, 27 L. Ed. 290 (1883).
15 § 6, Enforcement Act of May 30, 1870. For substance of this Act see
18 U. S. C. 51.
that right. The Harris case declared a federal statute of a similar
nature unconstitutional because it dealt with individual rather than
state action. Thus these two cases clearly do not apply, for the argu-
ment is that the states are the violators of this amendment by their
inaction. In Truax v. Corrigan,16 for example, the Supreme Court
held invalid, under both the "due process" and "equal protection"
clauses of the Fourteenth Amendment, the attempted withdrawal by
the Arizona Legislature of the weapon of injunction in labor dispute
cases.
When such a violation of the Fourteenth Amendment by a state
does take place, it may be remedied by Congress without specific con-
stitutional authorization for the particular method chosen. In sup-
port of this important proposition, three cases provide good authority:
Texas v. Whit, 1 7 Ex parte Yarbrougk,18 and Strauder v. West Vir-
ginia.1 9 In the first case, the Court speaks of the powers of Congress
and says, "In the exercise of the powers conferred by the guaranty
clause, as in the exercise of every other constitutional power, a discre-
tion in the choice of means is necessarily allowed." 20 In the Yar-
brough case, the Court denied a writ of habeas corpus to eight defend-
ants who had been imprisoned following conviction of the charge of
conspiracy to prevent a Negro from voting. They alleged that the
trial was null and void for want of jurisdiction, and that Congress did
not have the right to punish private citizens for interfering with a fed-
eral election. The Court, in denying the writ, stated that although no
express power has been given to Congress by the Constitution to pro-
vide for the prevention of violence exercised against the voter to con-
trol his vote at an election, it does not follow that no such law can be
enacted. In construing the Constitution of the United States, what is
implied is as much a part of the instrument as what is expressed. Very
similar to this is the Strauder case in which the Supreme Court held a
state statute unconstitutional as a violation of the Fourteenth Amend-
ment. Strauder, a Negro, was convicted of murder by a jury com-
posed entirely of white men under this state law which limited jury
service to White, male citizens. He claimed this law denied him the
equal protection of the law required by the Fourteenth Amendment. In
upholding his contention, the Court said:
It was desigued to assure to the colored race the enjoyment
ofiall the civil rights that under the law are enjoyed by white
persons, and to give to that race that protection of the General
Government, in that enjoyment, whenever it should be denied
by the States. It not only gave citizenship and the privileges
of citizenship to persons of color, but it denied to any State
16 257 U. S. 312, 42 S. Ct. 124, 66 L. Ed. 254, 27 A. L. R. 375 (1921).
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thepower to withhold from them the equal protection of the
laws, and authorized Congress to enforce its provisions by ap-
propriate legislation...
... The fourteenth amendment makes no attempt to enum-
erate the rights designed to protect. It speaks in general
terms, and those are as comprehensive as possible. Its lan-
guage is prohibitory; but every prohibition implies that exist-
ence of rights and immunities, prominent among which is an
immunity from inequality of legal protection, either for life,
liberty, or prosperity. Any State action that denies this im-
munity to a colored man is in conflict with the Constitution.
It is important to note at this point that the discretionary power
of Congress need not be relied on wholly in showing authority to act
under the Fourteenth Amendment to prevent state violation of civil
rights. The leading case of Screws v. United States,21 is direct author-
ity for the constitutionality of federal legislation as applied to state
officials. In this case the petitioner, a sheriff of Baker County, Georgia,
and two others who had assisted him in arresting a young Negro
had been indicted and convicted under two sections of the Criminal
Code.22 The case was reversed on other grounds, but in the course
of their arguments it was made clear that Congress was acting within
the authority conferred upon it by the Fourteenth Amendment in en-
acting those sections of the Criminal Code.
Two years later, this case was followed in affirming the conviction
of a local official for depriving a citizen of his civil rights.=3 The
officer had arrested a Negro who "looked drunk", had severely beaten
him with a bull whip, and had forced him to jump into a river resulting
in his death. On the authority of the Screws case, the conviction under
the Criminal Code was upheld.
One argument often used by advocates of federal antilynching legis-
lation seems rather farfetched. It is said that lynching substitutes a
private, arbitrary, mob rule type of government for the republican form
of government guaranteed by the Constitution. And since Article Four,
11 7 Wall 700 (U. S. 1869), 19 L. Ed. 227.
18 110 U. S. 651, 4 S. Ct. 152, 28 L. Ed. 274 (1883).
19 100 U. S. 303, 25 L. Ed. 664 (1879).
20 Texas v. White, 110 U. S. 651, 729, 4 S. Ct. 152, 28 L. Ed. 274 (1883).
21 325 U. S. 91, 65 S. Ct. 1031, 89 L. Ed. 1495, 162 A. L. R. 1330 (1945).
22 18 U. S. C. 52, section 20, and 18 U. S. C. 88, section 37. 18 U. S. C.
52 reads in part: ". . . Whoever under color of any law .. . subjects, or causes to
be subjected, any inhabitant of any State, Territory, or District to the deprivation
of any rights, privileges, or immunities secured or protected by the Constitution
... or by reason of his color, or race . . . shall be fined not more than $1000 or
imprisoned not more than one year or both."
23 Crews v. United States, 160 F. (2d) 746 (C. C. A. 5th 1947).
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Section Four of the Constitution provides that "the United States shall
guarantee to every State in this union, a republican form of govern-
ment," it is contended that congress must pass such legislation in
accordance with this obligation. For example, in reference to the
setting up of a military government in Rhode Island at the time its
state constitution went into effect, the Supreme Court said, 2 4 "... un-
questionably a military government, established as the permanent gov-
ermnent of the State, would not be a republican form of government,
and it wouuld be the duty of Congress to overthrow it." The same
thing is said to apply to a lynch mob, and that Congress must therefore.
enact such legislation. Incidentally, this same case finally ended the
belief once held that it was the courts, rather than Congress, who are
charged with this duty.
The treaty-making power of the United States is also relied upon to
sustain the validity of such a federal statute. By Article Six of the
Constitution such treaties are the supreme law of the land, while Article
One, Section Eight, Clause Ten empowers Congress "to define and pun-
ish... offenses against the law of nations." Under these two sections,
it has long been recognized that Congress has broad powers to legis-
late as to matters important to our international affairs. Consequently,
powers that are not specifically provided for in the Constitution are
inherent in this treaty-making power. For example, in Missouri v.
Holland,25 the state of Missouri brought a bill in equity to prevent the
United States from enforcing the Migratory Bird Treaty Act of July 3,
1918,26 which sought to effectuate a treaty between the United States
and .Great Britain. The Court upheld the validity of the Act under
this treaty power.
The point of this argument is that in a similar manner Congress has
acquired power to legislate against lynching. The United Nations
Charter, which was ratified as a treaty of the United States,27 pro-
vides in article fifty-five that the United Nations shall promote "uni-
versal respect for, and observance of, human rights and fundamental
freedoms for all without distinction as to race, sex, language, or re-
ligion." Protection of racial minorities was also involved in the peace
treaties with Italy, Romania, Bulgaria, and Hungary.28
However, the argument does not seem too sound. It does not ans-
wer the objection that might be raised; namely, that, granted the
treaty power would give Congress power to deal with lynching if it
24 Luther v. Borden, 7 How. 1 (U. S. 1849), 12 L. Ed. 581.
25 252 U. S. 416, 40 S. Ct. 382, 64 L. Ed. 641, 11 A. L. R. 984 (1920).
26 40 STAT. 755, 16 U. S. C. §§ 703-711.
27 59 STAT. 1031.
28 93 Cong. Rec. 6307 (June 2, 1947), 93 Cong. Rec. 6567-6584 (June 5, 1947).
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could not otherwise be inferred, would it give Congress this power if
such power were considered forbidden by the Constitution? Missouri
raised this question 2 when it alleged that the Migratory Bird Act
unconstitutionally interferred with rights reserved to the states by the
Tenth Amendment. Specifically, it was argued that a treaty could
not be valid if it infringed on the Constitution; that there are there-
fore limits to the treaty-making power-one such limit being that a
treaty could not do that which could not be done by an act of Con-
gress unaided. This is perhaps an overstatement of the objection,
but it still stands as an important consideration since the Court side-
stepped it by holding that the act in no way infringed on the Tenth
Amendment. Thus, no matter how much emotional or popular appeal
such an argument might have, it does not have too firm a legal founda-
tion. Whether or not a federal antilynching law would be constitutional
or not clearly depends on the construction of the Fourteenth Amend-
ment to the Constitution.
The only other portion of the Constitution that has been relied upon
to any extent is the Thirteenth Amendment, but it appears quite defin-
itely settled that this will not support the federal view. Indeed, the
Supreme Court once held 8o that there is no authority unless it be in
the Fourteenth Amendment. N4ot only has it been definitely settled
by inference that the Thirteenth Amendment does not apply, but in
dealing with a federal statute on civil rights,-1 the Supreme Court once
specifically held that: 32
Congress was not empowered by the Thirteenth Amendment
to make lynching an offense against the United States cog-
nizable in the Federal courts . . . but the remedy must be
sought through state action in state tribunals, subject to su-
pervision by the Supreme Court by writ of error in proper
cases.
As a result of this case, an Alabama Judge was forced to reverse
his position. In a very similar case,38 he had upheld the conviction of
the appellant who had been tried and convicted under this Act for
lynching. In the companion case,3 4 this same jurist, Judge Jones, on
the strength of the Supreme Court's holding in the case just quoted,
29 Missouri v. Holland, 252 U. S. 416, 40 S. Ct. 382, 64 L. Ed. 641, 11 A. L. R.
984 (1920).
30 Slaughter-House Cases, 16 Wall 36 (U. S. 1873), 21 L. Ed. 394.
31 14 STAT. 27 (1886).
32 Hodges v. United States, 203 U. S. 1, 27 S. Ct. 6, 51 L. Ed. 65 (1906).
33 Ex parte Riggins, 134 Fed. 404 (C. C. N. D. Ala. 1904), Reversed- 199
U. S. 547, 26 S. Ct. 147, 50 L. Ed. 303 (1905).
84 United States v. Powell, 151 Fed. 648 (C. C. N. D. Ala. 1907), Aff'd Mem,
212 U. S. 564, 29 S. Ct. 690, 53 L. Ed. 653 (1908).
